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WHOSE CANDY ARE WE REALLY TAKING?
AN EXPLORATION OF THE CANDYMAN CASES
AND THE DIVIDE WITHIN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Lauren E. Curry*
INTRODUCTION
The Internet, now a ubiquitous and readily accessible means of
communication and information seeking, has become a way for people to
easily commit crimes with a swift movement of their fingertips. For
example, the Internet has made the collection and exchange of child
pornography a relatively simple task. Law enforcement agents and the U.S.
Supreme Court have struggled to deal with the problem of child
pornography, whose perpetrators "[have] evaded repeated attempts to stamp
it out."' In 1995, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) implemented a
program called the Innocent Images Initiative ("Initiative"), 2 composed of
twenty-three task forces in fifty-six FBI field offices around the United
States.3 The purpose of the Initiative is to "investigate and eradicate online
sexual exploitation of children and the production and distribution of child
pornography." 4 Three e-groups, groups of people communicating via the
internet, provided by the Internet service provider Yahoo! Inc. ("Yahoo!"),
were found to be involved with "posting, exchanging, and transmitting
child pornography."' 5 One Web site, named "The Candyman," contained a
welcome message for its e-group that stated, "This is a group for People
who love kids."'6 In March 2002, the Initiative implemented "Operation
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. This Note is dedicated to the
memory of Salvatore "Tory" Zabatino (1981-2005). His list of important things to do in life
was an inspiration to many. We should all make the time to "stay up all night and watch the
sun rise; achieve our dreams; walk barefoot on the sand; lie in the grass wearing all white
clothing; and read bedtime stories to our children."
1. Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999).
2. Press Release, FBI National Press Office, Operation Candyman (Mar. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressre1/pressrel02/cm03l802.htm.
3. Id.; FBI, Innocent Images National Initiative, http://www.fbi.gov/innocent.htm (last
visited Sept. 3, 2006).
4. FBI National Press Office, supra note 2.
5. Jasmin J. Farhangian, A Problem of "Virtual" Proportions: The Difficulties
Inherent in Tailoring Virtual Child Pornography Laws to Meet Constitutional Standards, 12
J.L. & Pol'y 241, 280 (2003); see also FBI National Press Office, supra note 2.
6. United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The e-group fell
under the description "Category: Top: Adult: Image Galleries: Transgender: Members"
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Candyman," which targeted the Candyman site as well as other similar sites
and led to a number of arrests. 7
The operation was seemingly a beneficial and important initiative in
combating child pornography, but the operation has spurred a controversy
within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.8 The controversy
centered around whether probable cause still existed to search potential
offenders' homes and computers when erroneous information, found to be
recklessly and/or knowingly added to the affidavits used to obtain warrants,
was excised from those affidavits. 9 United States v. Martin (Martin I),10
United States v. Coreas (Coreas I),"I and United States v. Perez12 are three
of the cases that stemmed from the Operation Candyman investigations. In
Martin I, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that after the
erroneous portions of the affidavit were removed, probable cause still
existed when a defendant joined an e-group that had a welcome message
stating that pictures and videos of children were available for viewing,
posting, and trading. 13  In contrast, in Coreas I, the Second Circuit
vehemently rejected a finding of probable cause but held that its decision
must follow the precedent set by Martin L 14 Similarly, in Perez, the district
court held that probable cause did not exist when the erroneous information
in the affidavit was removed. 15
These three cases, part of a series of cases collectively known as "the
Candyman cases," have created a controversy and a three-way tug-of-war
between the First Amendment right to free speech, the Fourth Amendment
restrictions on search and seizure, and the societal concern of protecting
children against exploitation and potential abuse. 16 In each of these cases,
on www.yahoo.com, and the welcome message also told potential members that they could
"post any type of messages" or "any type of pics and vids." Id.
7. See infra Part I.E.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.
10. 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2005), reh 'g denied, 426 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc
denied, 430 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2861 (2006).
11. 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 426 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 2005), reh'g en
banc denied, United States v. Martin (Martin II1), 430 F.3d 73 (2d. Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S.Ct. 2861 (2006). The appellants in Martin I and Coreas I were denied both a
rehearing and a rehearing en banc. See United States v. Martin (Martin I), 426 F.3d 83 (2d
Cir. 2005); United States v. Coreas (Coreas I1), 426 F.3d 615 (2d. Cir. 2005); see also
United States v. Martin (Martin II1), 430 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2005) (denying rehearing en banc
for both Martin I and Coreas I).
12. 247 F. Supp. 2d459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
15. 247 F. Supp. 2d 459; see infra Part II.B.3.
16. As District Judge Denny Chin stated in Perez,
On the one hand, child pornography and the sexual abuse of children are crimes
that have been fueled by the internet, as those who would exploit children have
sought to take advantage of the internet's vast and largely anonymous distribution
and communications network. On the other hand, when law enforcement gathers
information about the activity of individuals on the internet, the potential for
unreasonable intrusions into the home-the chief concern of the drafters of the
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child pornography was found in the defendants' possession. The
Candyman cases all concerned the process ultimately used to find the child
pornography, not whether the defendants actually broke the law.
Part I of this Note discusses child pornography, the prevalence of child
pornography on the Internet, efforts to combat child pornography, and First
and Fourth Amendment concerns. Part II introduces and analyzes the
Candyman cases and subsequent appellate decisions. Finally, Part III
argues that the Martin I and Martin I decisions were based on a broad
generalization of people who choose to join questionable e-groups rather
than an individualized finding of probable cause as required by the Fourth
Amendment. Part III argues that any case with circumstances similar to the
Candyman cases must also be evaluated on an individual basis and that
probable cause must be found on the particular facts of each case, rather
than on the blanket idea that subscribing to an e-group in and of itself can
suffice to establish probable cause. Part III concludes by advocating for a
stringent means of monitoring Internet postings to combat child
pornography without violating Fourth Amendment rights.
I. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
A. Child Pornography: Background
Congress has attempted to address and curb the actions of people who
desire to engage in sexual acts with children and commit criminal acts to
gratify their impulses. 17 "The most expeditious if not the only practical
method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for [child
pornography] by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling,
advertising, or otherwise promoting the [pornography]."' 18 Thus, receiving
pornography in interstate commerce consisting of a visual depiction of an
actual person less than eighteen years of age is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(2)(A). 19 In Osborne v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that a
proximate link between child pornography and child abuse justified a ban
on the possession of child pornography. 20 The Court held that, "[g]iven the
importance of the State's interest in protecting the victims of child
pornography," a state is justified in "attempting to stamp out this vice at all
levels in the distribution chain."'21
Fourth Amendment-is great. Th[ese] case[s] demonstrate[] the tension that can
exist ....
247 F. Supp. 2d at 461.
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000); see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Admin. for Children & Families, Child Maltreatment 2004, at 39 (2006), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm04/cmO4.pdf (finding that approximately
84,000 children were victims of sexual abuse in 2004).
18. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (2000).
20. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
21. Id. at 110.
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1. Definition of Child Pornography
Child pornography is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) as
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit
conduct, where-
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or
computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to
appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.22
A person who posts a notice on the Internet seeking to receive or exchange
images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct violates 18 U.S.C. §
2251.23 Section 2252A governs certain activities relating to material
constituting or containing child pornography.24
22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(A)-(C) (Supp. 2006). All nine U.S. Supreme Court justices
found provision (B) to violate the First Amendment in Ashcrofi v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234, 257-88 (2002). Child pornography involves the "trading, collecting, viewing,
taking and producing [of] sexual images of children on-line." John McCarthy & Nathan
Gaunt, "But I Was Only Looking..." Responding Effectively to On-line Child Pornography
Offenders 1 (2005), available at http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybersafety/extensions/
pdfs/papers/johnmccarthy.pdf.
23. The statute provides,
(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or
who transports any minor in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or
Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows
or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or
foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using materials
that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been
transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
24. In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 leads to the prosecution of
(a) [a]ny person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(2) knowingly receives or distributes, any visual depiction that has been mailed,
or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which
contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any
means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction in
interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if-
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"Child pornography abuses, degrades and exploits the weakest and most
vulnerable members of our society. '2 5 Children are harmed from both the
creation and distribution of child pornography: The children involved
suffer emotional and psychological problems, and once the pornography is
created, a record of it can feasibly exist forever.2 6 The images can also be
used as a form of "peer pressure" for sexual abusers to coax children into
participating in sexual acts. 27
2. Child Pornography Offenders
According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
prosecutions of child pornographers have increased approximately ten
percent annually since 1995.28 Those who view child pornography, also
known as "child pornography offenders,"2 9 may view child pornography for
a variety of reasons. 30 Research has suggested that child pornography
offenders demonstrate four characteristics: (1) a predisposition towards
sexual contact with children; (2) the ability to overcome their inhibitions;
(3) the ability to overcome a victim's resistance to abuse; and (4) the
opportunity to offend by viewing and/or trading child pornography. 31 Child
pornography offenders are assisted in overcoming their inhibitions or
personal moral codes by participating in chat rooms that downplay harm
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; ...
[(4)](B) knowingly possesses 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video
tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was
produced using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by
any means including by computer, if-
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct ....
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000).
25. See Farhangian, supra note 5, at 276-77 (internal quotations omitted).
26. Id. at 277.
27. Id.
28. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., Announcement of New Internet Crimes
Against Children Task Force Grants (Dec. 13, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speech/icacgrantsremarks.htm.
29. See McCarthy & Gaunt, supra note 22, at 1.
30. Id. at 1-2 ("Some child pornographers will only ever look;, some will only ever
collect... ; some will only ever participate in 'social networks' on-line... ; some will take
photographs of children to trade; some will use child pornography to approach or 'groom'
children for further abuse; some will blackmail children who participate in making child
pornography in order that the child will co-operate in other sexual ways. Some offenders
will try to use child pornography instead of abusing a child. Others will already be using it
while abusing a child.").
31. Id. at 2; see also David Finkelhor & Sharon Araji, Explanations of Pedophilia: A




done to children, stress the acceptability of the behavior, and give rise to the
notion that many others are involved in it as well. 32
B. Child Pornography: Its Presence and Efforts to Combat It
1. Child Pornography and the Internet
The Internet is home to a large amount of sexually explicit material that
is readily accessible to almost anyone with access to a computer. Child
pornography used to be found mainly in physical form, such as
photographs, but the advent of the Internet has become a "mechanism for
making, displaying, trading and distributing child pornography" and a
"vehicle for child pornographers to make contact with and ensnare new
victims." 33 Pictures and video can be sent over the Internet in a private
manner 34-trips to video stores have become unnecessary to some degree.
Someone wanting access to pornography need not give a name or any other
identifying information. Rather, he or she can simply access sexually
explicit material at the click of a mouse. Discussion groups are also
popular sources of pornographic materials.35 There are several groups that
deal with sexual topics, including sexual preferences, stories, and
practices. 36 Although adult-oriented Web sites account for a small portion
of all Web sites (approximately 1.5 percent), about seventy million
individuals view at least one adult Web site per week, twenty million of
whom are looking at sites hosted in the United States and Canada. 37 There
are approximately ten million subscribers to such sites in the United
States. 38  Researchers and law-enforcement officials believe that the
proliferation of the Internet 39 is causing an increase in the possession and
distribution of child pornography. 40 The U.S. Department of Justice, in an
effort to combat child pornography, has instituted the CyberTipline, a
national clearinghouse for reports of Internet-related child pornography and
other Internet-related sex crimes against children.41
32. See McCarthy & Gaunt, supra note 22, at 2.
33. John Carr, Theme Paper for the 2nd World Congress on Commercial Sexual
Exploitation of Children: Child Pornography 3 (2001), http://www.ecpat.net/eng/
Ecpatjinter/projects/monitoring/wc2/yokohama themeschildpomography.pdf.
34. 61 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 51 (2001).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Computer Sci. and Telecomm. Bd., Nat'l Research Council, Youth, Pornography
and the Internet 72-73 (2002), available at
http://darwin.nap.eduibooks/0309082749/html/72.html.
38. Id. at 73.
39. Madeleine Schachter, Law of Internet Speech 15 (2d ed. 2002) ("The number of
computers and users connected to the Internet has increased exponentially in recent years.").
In 1999, approximately 109 million people in over 159 countries were using the Internet. Id.
40. Janis Wolak et al., Child-Pornography Possessors Arrested in Internet-Related
Crimes: Findings from the National Juvenile Online Victimization Study, at ix (2005).
41. Id.
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The United States Code governs the reporting of child pornography by
electronic communication services:
Whoever, while engaged in providing an electronic communication
service or a remote computing service to the public, through a facility or
means of interstate or foreign commerce, obtains knowledge of facts or
circumstances from which a violation of [offenses] involving child
pornography. . . is apparent, shall. . . report [those] facts or
circumstances to the [CyberTipline] at the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children .... 42
Many Internet providers have a system of monitoring and finding child
pornography. However, some savvy posters of child pornography sites
evade checks by disguising words. For example instead of "kids" an
offender may include "k!ds" in the title of a Web site so that an automatic
checking system would not pick up the word.43
2. Preferential Sex Offenders: A Profile
Because some of the courts that upheld evidence obtained from
adulterated warrants4 discuss the need to protect children from sex
offenders and discuss characteristics of child pornography offenders, it is
important to examine characteristics of both people who own child
pornography and those who sexually abuse children. People who abuse
children, known as "preferential" sex offenders, tend to use erotic imagery
and repeated fantasies to satisfy their needs. 45 These needs take precedence
over potential risks of getting caught, and any collections of pornography
tend to focus on paraphilic preferences. 46 Preferential sex offenders are
more likely to view, be aroused by, and collect pornography following a
particular theme, such as child pornography. 47 As such, a pedophile,
someone who sexually abuses children, would be more likely to collect
child pornography.48 Preferential sexual offenders' "sexual behavior is
42. 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b)(1) (Supp. 2006).
43. Transcript of Record at 24, United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (No. 02-854) [hereinafter Perez Transcript].
44. See infra Part II.A.
45. Kenneth V. Lanning, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Child Molesters:
A Behavioral Analysis for Law-Enforcement Officers Investigating the Sexual Exploitation
of Children by Acquaintance Molesters 24 (4th ed. 2001), available at
http://www.missingkids.com/enUS/publications/NC70.pdf.
46. Id. Paraphilia is a psychosexual disorder characterized as "recurrent, intense
sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman
objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or other
non-consenting persons and that occur over a period of at least 6 months." Am. Psychiatric
Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 522-23 (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM-IV].
47. See DSM-IV, supra note 46, at 522-23.
48. See id. at 523. The converse theory, that viewing child pornography would lead
adults to seek out children for sexual encounters, has not been statistically supported. See
David L. Riegal, Letter to the Editor: Effects on Boy-Attracted Pedosexual Males of
Viewing Boy Erotica, 33 Archives of Sexual Behav. 321-23 (2004). "Does viewing erotic
2006]
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rooted in their sexual fantasies and need to turn fantasy into reality. '49
Such a person usually has a high verbal level, is not likely to use physical
violence to control victims, and is likely to have a history of sex offenses.50
Preferential sex offenders tend to make "needy" mistakes that can be
characterized as "sloppy."'51 As a prime example of such a mistake, an
offender employed as a teacher had a pornographic videotape sent to the
school where he worked and then played the tape at the school rather than
waiting until he got home, thereby creating a greater risk of detection. 52
Preferential sex offenders with a definite preference for children have
"sexual fantasies and erotic imagery that focus on children" and "have the
potential to molest large numbers of child victims. '53 For these people,
"their problem is not only the nature of the sex drive (attraction to children),
but also the quantity (need for frequent and repeated sex with children). '54
Although there is not a profile that will determine if someone is a child
molester, preferential sex offenders tend to engage in highly predictable and
recognizable behavior patterns. Law-enforcement investigations have
revealed that preferential sex offenders almost always collect theme
pornography related to their sexual preferences. 55 Enforcement experts
have been used to educate the courts about certain behavioral patterns. 56 If
an investigator identifies a number of patterns, it might be acceptable for
him or her to assume remaining ones. Characteristics include long-term
pictures of boys exacerbate the tendency for pedosexually inclined males to seek out boys
for sexual purposes? The commonly perceived wisdom would answer 'yes,' but there are
little or no credible data to support this position." Id. at 321. See also Dennis Howitt,
Pornography and the Paedophile: Is It Criminogenic?, 68 Brit. J. of Med. Psychol. 15, 17
(1995) ("No clear-cut causal link has been demonstrated between . . . exposure to
pornography and sex crime.").
49. See Lanning, supra note 45, at 24.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 25.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 27. Some studies, while not proving a causational link between viewing
child pornography and child molestation, have pointed to a relationship between child
pornography offending and sexual assaults on children. See McCarthy & Gaunt, supra note
22, at 3-4.
54. Lanning, supra note 45, at 27.
55. Id. at 61; see McCarthy & Gaunt, supra note 22, at 3 ("While there is no proven
causal link between looking at child pornography and later sexually assaulting a child, it is
important to recognise that child pornography is, itself, child sexual abuse. While child
pornography offenders may never commit a physical offence on a child, they participate in
the sexual abuse of children because the images they desire can only occur through children
being sexually assaulted.").
56. See, e.g., United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 582-84 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding
that an agent could give his expert opinion on characteristics of "preferential" child
molesters and the methods they use to attract and/or abuse children); United States v. Cross,
928 F.2d 1030, 1050 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that an agent could describe the habits of
pedophiles and testify that "such persons characteristically derive sexual satisfaction from
and collect even such ostensibly non-sexual nude photographs of children ... [since] [s]uch
evidence clearly shed light on one of the critical issues in the case-whether [the defendant]
obtained the photos with the intention of using them to produce and distribute child
pornography").
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and persistent patterns of behavior, specific sexual interests, well-developed
techniques, and fantasy-driven behaviors.57 Terms such as preferential sex
offender, however, are descriptive labels and are not intended to be used for
diagnosis. 58
3. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) expanded the
federal prohibition of child pornography to include "[any] visual depiction,
including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-
generated image or picture," that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct" or any "visual depiction [that] is advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that
conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 59 In other words, the CPPA
banned images known as virtual child pornography. 60 The Supreme Court
ruled in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,61 that prohibiting child
pornography that does not depict an actual child exceeded New York v.
Ferber,62 which recognized a State's interest in protecting against the
exploitation of children by distinguishing child pornography from other
sexually explicit speech. Ferber held that pornography with minors can be
prohibited whether or not the images are obscene, since the general
definition of obscenity "[did] not reflect the State's particular ... interest in
prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children."63
Because the CPPA banned pornography that did not involve "real" minors,
the Court ruled it unconstitutional. 64
The driving force behind the CPPA was that the pornographic images,
although not of real children, may "whet [the] sexual appetites" of
57. See Lanning, supra note 45, at 38. Lanning describes sixteen behaviors of
preferential sex offenders that fall under four categories. Id. "Long-term and Persistent
Pattem[s] of Behavior" include patterns beginning in early adolescence, spending time,
money, and energy, committing multiple offenses, and making ritual or need-driven
mistakes. Id. "Specific Sexual Interests" include manifesting paraphilic preferences (which
can be multiple preferences), focusing on defined sexual interests and victim characteristics,
centering life around preferences, and rationalizing sexual interests. Id. "Well-Developed
Techniques" include evaluating experiences, lying and manipulating (often skillfully),
having a method of access to victims, and being quick to use modem technology (e.g.,
computer and video) for sexual needs and purposes. Id. "Fantasy-Driven Behavior[s]"
include collecting theme pornography, collecting paraphernalia (e.g., souvenirs and
videotapes), recording fantasies, and acting to turn fantasy into reality. Id.
58. See id. at 29.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000). The language of Section (8)(B) now reads "is,
or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and
Section 8(D) has been repealed. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (Supp. 2006).
60. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239-40 (2002).
61. Id. at 235.
62. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
63. Id. at 761.
64. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
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pedophiles and "increas[e] the creation and distribution of child
pornography and the sexual abuse and exploitation of actual children." 65
Even so, the CPPA was ruled to be overbroad and a violation of First
Amendment rights. 66 The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."'67 A law imposing criminal
penalties on protected speech constitutes speech suppression. 68
The battle over the CPPA shed light on the standards needed to suppress
speech. In order to prohibit obscenity, the government "must prove that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive
in light of community standards, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." 69 The CPPA was struck down because the Act would
have prohibited making "a movie depicting the horrors of sexual abuse"
even if the images used were not "patently offensive." 70 In examining the
merits of the CPPA, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
CPPA was necessary since child pornography "whets the appetites of
pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct. '71 Rather,
the Court held that "the mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts
is not a sufficient reason for banning it."72  Laws cannot be made to
"'constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a
person's private thoughts."' 73
A recent battle ensued between Google, Inc., ("Google") and the Bush
administration. 74 The Bush administration, seeking to revive the 1998
Child Online Protection Act, which was struck down by the Supreme Court,
subpoenaed Google in 2005. Google refused to comply with the subpoena,
which required Google to produce details on what its users had been
looking for through its search engine. 75 The Government contended that it
65. Id. at 241.
66. Id. at 258. The Court noted that the Government failed to show a sufficient
connection between the speech, which may encourage thoughts, and any resulting child
abuse. Id. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the prohibition of virtual
images is necessary to eliminate the market for actual child pornography. Id. at 254. Finally,
the Court rejected the argument that virtual images make the prosecution of actual child
pornography too difficult. Id. at 254-55.
67. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
68. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244.
69. Id. at 246.
70. Id.; see Brian G. Slocum, Virtual Child Pornography: Does It Mean the End of the
Child Pornography Exception to the First Amendment?, 14 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 637, 639-
40 (2004).
71. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253.
72. Id.; see also Ryan P. Kennedy, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Can We Roast
the Pig Without Burning Down the House in Regulating "Virtual" Child Pornography?, 37
Akron L. Rev. 379 (2004) (explaining why the Supreme Court was correct in ruling the
Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 (CPPA) unconstitutional).
73. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)).
74. Associated Press, Feds Seek Google Records in Porn Probe, Law.com, Jan. 20,
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id= 137665109426.
75. Id. (The subpoena was "for a broad range of material from its databases, including a
request for 1 million random Web addresses and records of all Google searches from any
one-week period").
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needed the data to determine how often pornography shows up in online
searches in order to revive the 1998 law, which would have required adults
to register before they could see objectionable material online and would
have punished violators with fines of up to $50,000 or jail time. The
Supreme Court sided with Google, however, and ruled that technology such
as filtering software may better protect children.
76
4. National Juvenile Online Victimization Study
In 2001, a study called the National Juvenile Online Victimization Study
("N-JOV Study") found that "there has been little scientific data to track the
extent of [child pornography] possession cases . . . and describe their
characteristics." 77  This study addressed this need by surveying law
enforcement agencies within the United States and counted arrests of
Internet-related sex crimes.78  The N-JOV Study examined the
characteristics of the offenders, the crimes committed, and the victims. Key
findings included the following: Almost all arrested offenders were male;
91% were white; 86% were over twenty-five; 83% had images of
prepubescent children; 80% had images graphically depicting sexual
penetration; 39% had at least one video with moving images of child
pornography; and 40% of arrested child pornography possessors were
"'dual offenders,' who sexually victimized children and possessed child
pornography, with both crimes discovered in the same investigation" while
"[a]n additional 15% were dual offenders who attempted to sexually
victimize children by soliciting undercover investigators who posed online
as minors." 79
The N-JOV Study found that the vast majority of child pornography
possessors had images of explicit sexual acts and not simply suggestive
images of children. 80 "Most arrested child pornography possessors (79%)
also had what might be termed 'softcore' images of nude or semi-nude
minors, but only 1% possessed such images alone. Further some of those
with softcore images only also had sexually victimized children."
81
5. Yahoo!'s Reforms to Protect Children
On October 12, 2005, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and
Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning announced a settlement agreement
with Yahoo! that removed and barred the posting of user-created chat
76. Id.
77. See Wolak et al., supra note 40, at ix.
78. Id. at vii.
79. Id. at vii-viii. The National Juvenile Online Victimization Study ("N-JOV")
statistics are "[e]stimate[s] based on a survey of 2,574 local, county, and state and 2 federal
law-enforcement agencies involving arrests between July 1, 2000, and June 30, 2001.
Percentages refer to [child pornography] possessors, not child-pornography images." Id. at 6.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 5.
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rooms with names that promoted sex between minors and adults.82 In June
2005, pursuant to discussions with the Attorneys General, Yahoo! removed
or barred approximately 70,000 user-created chat rooms whose names
suggested that they facilitated illegal conduct, including promoting sex
between adults and minors.83 The removed chat rooms included labels such
as "5-13 kiddies who love sex," "girlsl3 & up for much older men," "8-12
yo girls for older men," and "teen girls for older fat men. ' 84 Many of the
chat rooms were located within the "Schools and Education" and "Teen"
chat categories. 85 While the main goal was prevention of children having
unfettered access to illegal and explicit materials, the controls also helped to
identify groups where adults went to exchange child pornography.86
This settlement was the first agreement that instituted system-wide
controls over categories of chat rooms that are likely to be frequented by
child predators.8 7 The agreement instituted the following measures:
Should Yahoo! reinstate such user-created chat rooms, it must pre-screen
all user-created chat room names, so that any chat room name
encouraging sex acts between adults and minors will not be posted; In the
event Yahoo! becomes aware of any such chat room, despite these
controls, it must purge the room from its site within [twenty-four] hours;
Yahoo! will make it easier to report any threats to child safety, give
priority to such complaints, and designate specific employees to do so;
Yahoo! will develop education materials and feature them on the Yahoo!
network, promoting the safe use of chat rooms .... 88
82. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Agreement Removes and Bars Predators'
Chat Rooms: Yahoo! Implements Sweeping Reforms to Protect Children (Oct. 12, 2005),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/oct/octl2a_05.html; see also Mark
Harrington, Sex Predators Shut Out of Chat Rooms, Newsday, Oct. 13, 2005, at A3.
Authorities did not have to resort to litigation. "Spitzer said... Yahoo, 'acting as a good
corporate citizen,.., did the right thing. We asked them to create a filter to stop this kind of
thing and they have done so."' Associated Press, Yahoo to Shut Chats Promoting Adult-
Child Sex: Internet Portal Agrees to Series of Restrictions, Including Prescreening,
MSNBC.com, Oct. 12, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9672336/ [hereinafter Yahoo].
83. See N.Y. Attorney General, supra note 82.
84. See Harrington, supra note 82; Yahoo, supra note 82.
85. See Yahoo, supra note 82.
86. See Harrington, supra note 82.
87. See Yahoo, supra note 82; see also Harrington, supra note 82. Yahoo!-created
groups are still operating, except for one called "teens." Yahoo! requires users to be 18 or
over to subscribe to the groups. Id. "'We need to be vigilant to protect our children,' Spitzer
said. 'It is imperative that parents, industry, prosecutors and lawmakers all work together to
identify and address possible threats, and that we teach our children to protect themselves
from those who would do them harm."' See N.Y. Attorney General, supra note 82.
88. N.Y. Attorney General, supra note 82; see Yahoo, supra note 82 ("[I]t [is] not clear
how the company [will] prevent children from signing up as adults because credit cards
aren't required.").
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C. First Amendment Concerns
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech."' 89 Generally, the First Amendment bars
the government from controlling what people see, read, speak, or hear.
Nevertheless, there are some limits to the freedom of speech.90 The
prospect of crime alone does not justify laws suppressing speech, and a
statute is unconstitutional if, on its face, it prohibits a substantial amount of
protected speech. 9 1  In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that "First
Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to
control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right
to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the
government because speech is the beginning of thought. '92
The First Amendment has been applied directly to child pornography. 9 3
First Amendment protection is not extended to the "private possession of
child pornography" because child pornography is a product of sexual abuse
of children.94 In United States v. Ferber, however, the Court held that
when speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, such as
virtual child pornography, the speech still falls within the protection of the
First Amendment. 95  Congress has, however, enacted legislation
specifically targeted at combating child pornography and obscenity on the
Internet. 96 In a plurality opinion in United States v. American Library
Ass'n, the Court upheld the Children's Internet Protection Act as
constitutional because the Court considered requiring public libraries to
install pornography-blocking software on computers "as a constitutional
refusal by the government to subsidize certain speech, rather than an
unconstitutional 'penalty' on that speech. '9 7 The Court also noted that
89. U.S. Const. amend. I.
90. Certain categories of speech, including obscenity, child pornography involving
actual children, defamation, and incitement are not protected by the First Amendment. See
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion of how the CPPA was ruled
unconstitutional because it violated First Amendment rights, see supra Part I.B.3.
91. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123-24 (2003).
92. Id. at 253.
93. See Part I.B.3.
94. See Farhangian, supra note 5, at 249 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 139
(1990)). A state can prohibit possession and viewing of child pornography because there is a
compelling state interest in "protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors
and in destroying the market for the exploitative use of children." Osborne, 495 U.S. at 103.
95. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 251 (2002) (citing New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982)).
96. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). The Court upheld the
Children's Internet Protection Act, which was enacted to protect children from harmful
Internet content by requiring any public libraries receiving federal funding to install software
that blocks obscene and pornographic images on the Internet, as not unduly burdensome on
First Amendment rights. Id.
97. ACLU v. Mineta, 319 F. Supp. 2d 69, 84 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Am. Library Ass'n,
539 U.S. 194); accord Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
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[m]ost libraries already exclude pornography from their print collections
because they deem it inappropriate for inclusion. We do not subject these
decisions to heightened scrutiny; it would make little sense to treat
libraries' judgments to block online pornography any differently, when
these judgments are made for just the same reason.98
D. Fourth Amendment Concerns
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." 99 The Supreme Court ruled in Franks v. Delaware that a defendant
may challenge a search warrant that was issued based on an affidavit
containing false information.' 00 A search warrant must be voided, and
evidence suppressed, if a defendant shows, by a preponderance of the
evidence: that the affidavit (1) contained deliberately or recklessly false or
misleading information and (2) that the remaining content of the affidavit is
insufficient to establish probable cause when the false material is
excised.' 0 ' Although not every statement in an affidavit is required to be
true, 102 the affidavit must be "'truthful' in the sense that the information
put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true." 10 3 By
law, a warrant affidavit must include facts and circumstances that show the
existence of probable cause and "allow the magistrate to make an
independent evaluation of the matter." 104  Furthermore, the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonableness as to "whether a search should be
'conducted at all, [and] also to ensure reasonableness in the manner and
scope of searches and seizures that are carried out." 10 5
98. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 208.
99. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
100. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
101. Id. at 155-56; accord United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 717-18 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 165; Canfield, 212 F.3d at 717-18; United States v. Trzaska,
111 F.3d 1019, 1027 (2d Cir. 1997). If a defendant can show that false statements were
deliberately or recklessly included in a warrant affidavit, a court should ignore the allegedly
false statements and determine whether the remaining portions of the affidavit would support
probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72. If the remaining portions of the affidavit do not
establish probable cause, a court should conduct a hearing to determine whether the
statements were actually false and whether they were made knowingly or with reckless
disregard for the truth. Id. at 172.
103. Franks, 438 U.S. at 165.
104. Id. Negligence or innocent mistake is not a sufficient basis for a defendant's
challenge of an affidavit. See id. at 171.
105. United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Lauro v.
Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118-19 (2001) ("The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the
reasonableness of a search is determined 'by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."' (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
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Probable cause requires a "practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ...there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place."106
Probable cause also requires "the probability, and not a prima facie
showing, of criminal activity,"' 1 7 and "[o]nce it is established that probable
cause exists to believe a federal crime has been committed a warrant may
issue for the search of any property which the magistrate has probable cause
to believe may be the place of concealment of evidence of the crime." 10 8
The Fourth Amendment further requires individualized suspicion for
finding probable cause.10 9
The Internet has posed challenges to the way searches must be executed.
As applied to computer use, courts have ruled that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy against government searches of web sites or chat
rooms.1 10  Courts do not recognize a privacy interest where
communications have already been received and turned over to law
enforcement, and the courts apply this same principle to e-mails. I l I
There have been instances where the government has been allowed to
rely on circumstantial evidence to prove that pornography was obtained
through the Internet. For example, in United States v. Dodds,
circumstantial evidence was used in the prosecution of a defendant for
knowingly taking or receiving images of child pornography.' 12
U.S. 295, 300 (1999))); Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 483-84 ("The Court must evaluate the
reasonableness of a search by engaging in a practical, common-sense analysis, taking into
account the particular context in which probable cause is being assessed, and balancing the
rights of citizens to be secure in their homes from unwarranted intrusion against the needs of
law enforcement.").
106. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Court also noted that "[p]robable
cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id. at 232. The
Fourth Amendment requires no more than the magistrate having a substantial basis for
concluding that a search would produce evidence of wrongdoing. Id. at 236.
107. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
108. United States v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (1976).
109. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) ("Where the standard is probable cause, a
search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect
to that person."); see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment "generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent
individualized suspicion").
110. See Jim W. Ko, The Fourth Amendment and the Wiretap Act Fail to Protect Against
Random ISP Monitoring of E-mails for the Purpose of Assisting Law Enforcement, 22 J.
Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 493, 504 (citing United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F.
Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997)).
111. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that e-mails
should be treated as letters, in that once opened, the fate of the letter lies with the recipient
and not the sender).
112. United States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 900 (lth Cir. 2003) ("In this case, the
government presented evidence that a number of the photographs on Dodds's computer were
actually available and frequently traded on the internet. Some of the children that were in
the 66 images entered into evidence were proven to be in locations as varied as Missouri,
Florida, Pennsylvania, and the United Kingdom. . . .The government also showed that
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If a court rules that an affidavit for a warrant contains erroneous
information that was knowingly or recklessly included, the affidavit must
be corrected. 113 To correct the affidavit, a court must "disregard the
allegedly false statements," fill in omitted material, and then "determine
whether the remaining portions of the affidavit would support probable
cause to issue the warrant." 114 If, upon a subsequent de novo review, a
court determines that probable cause exists based on the "corrected"
affidavit, then suppression of evidence must be denied."l 5 The question is
"whether, after putting aside erroneous information and material omissions,
'there remains a residue of independent and lawful information sufficient to
support probable cause."'"116 This Note addresses cases in which the
warrants obtained were used to search the homes and personal computers of
the defendants. The home has a "special status," and courts have
emphasized the sanctity of the home."17 "In the home .... all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes." ' 18 The Supreme Court has held that the "physical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed."1 9 However, "[c]rime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters,
is . . . of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be
reached on proper showing."'120 The cases at issue in this Note, collectively
referred to as the Candyman cases, all included searches of defendants'
homes and personal computers. 121
Dodds had access to the internet and was familiar with using it (he had been 'caught' by his
wife viewing adult pornography sites on their home computer). Under our standard of
review, we find this evidence sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the contention
that Dodds had obtained at least some of the pictures over the internet.").
113. United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 717-18 (2d Cir. 2000).
114. Id. at 718 (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1985)).
117. Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603,612 (1999).
118. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
119. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (internal quotations omitted).
120. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
9 (1968) ("[W]herever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' he is
entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."); cf Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places").
121. See United States v. Shields, No. 05-3662, 2006 WL 2361465 (3d Cir. Aug. 16,
2006); Martin I, 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2005), reh "g denied, 426 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2005), reh 'g
en bane denied, 430 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct 2861 (2006); Coreas I,
419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 426 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 2005), reh'g en bane
denied, Martin III, 430 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2861 (2006); United
States v. Ramsburg, 114 F. App'x 78 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882
(5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Borostowski, 71 F. App'x 592 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Coye, No. 02 Cr. 732, 2004 WL 1743945 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004); United States v.
Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822
(D. Neb. 2003); United States v. Fantauzzi, 260 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); United
States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2003); United States v. Perez, 247 F.
Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Garlick, 61 M.J. 346 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
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E. The Candyman Cases
The Candyman cases involve defendants who subscribed to Web sites
that contained child pornography, and these cases center around whether
their subsequent arrests and convictions have implicated First Amendment
and Fourth Amendment rights.'2 2 In 2002, a lead child pornography
investigator infiltrated the Candyman e-group, which was advertised as a
site "for People who love kids."'1 23 The group was located under the
"Adult," "Image Galleries," and "Transgender" categories on Yahoo!
Groups. 124 As part of a multistate child pornography investigation, 125 FBI
Special Agent Geoffrey Binney took initiative to crack down on child
pornography Web sites in 2000.126 On January 2, 2001, Agent Binney
joined the Candyman Web site. 127 The Web site stated, "You can post any
type of messages you like too [sic] or any type of pics and vids you like too
[sic]. P.S. IF WE ALL WORK TOGETHER WE WILL HAVE THE
BEST GROUP ON THE NET."'128
During the course of the Candyman investigation, the FBI observed that
some Candyman members had started to exchange information about two
new e-groups that also focused on child pornography: "girlsl2-16" and
"shangri-la."' 129 Agent Binney told another FBI agent, Austin Berglas,
about his experiences with the e-group, and an affidavit was created. 130
The affidavit included a description of the Candyman Web site welcome
message and a representation that the group had 3397 members.' 3 ' Berglas,
122. See supra note 121.
123. See Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
124. See id. at 464. The court noted, "a first-time visitor to the site ... certainly would
have had some idea that the site provided access to child pornography." While there was no
explicit reference to child pornography or child erotica, the location of the group within the
adult category and its welcome message encouraging posting of pictures and videos alluded
to the presence of child pornography. Id. "On the other hand, the page also offered links or
tabs to several features that had the appearance of being-and actually were-text-based
..... "Id.
125. See United States v. Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
126. Coreas 1, 419 F.3d at 152.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Martin I, 426 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2005). The welcome pages for the e-groups were
solely text-based. There were no visual images on the welcome pages.
130. See Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
131. United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("The
affidavit explained that the Candyman Egroup website had several features, including a
'Files' section that permitted members to post images and videos for other members to
download. It also disclosed that the Candyman site offered a 'Polls' feature that permitted
members to answer survey questions; a 'Links' feature that permitted members to post links
to other websites; and a 'Chat' section that permitted members to engage in 'real time
conversations with each other."'). In addition to these text-based features, the site offered
members clickable options that potentially contained visual depictions. These included a
"Links" option to be transmitted to other Web sites that may or may not contain images as
well as a "Messages" option, where images may or may not be attached to messages posted
by other members. See id. at 462.
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as well as Binney, used these statements in the affidavit as a basis for search
warrant applications for the Candyman Web site. 132
Binney's affidavit included numerous material assertions that two courts
deemed knowingly or recklessly false. 133 Specifically, Binney stated that
he joined the Candyman group by sending an e-mail to the group's
moderator when he actually subscribed by clicking a button on the Web
site. 134 Furthermore, Binney asserted that all members of the Candyman
group had to send an e-mail to the group moderator to join the Web site,
which was inaccurate. 135 Binney also erroneously stated that all members
of the Candyman group automatically received all messages and files sent
to the group by any other member. 136 In actuality, all members were given
three options regarding receipt of e-mails and files, one of which was not to
receive any e-mails at all. 137 Agent Binney himself joined the site by
clicking on a "join" button on the site, and he chose the automatic option
after he, like all other subscribers, was presented with the option to either
(1) receive each e-mail automatically, (2) receive a digest of each day's e-
mails, or (3) receive no automatic e-mails whatsoever.138 Data showed that
"more than 85 percent of the Candyman members elected to receive no
automatic e-mails whatsoever."' 139
Between January 2, 2001 and February 6, 2001 (when the Candyman
Web site was shut down), Binney received 498 e-mail messages from the
group, about 100 of which contained one or more picture or video files. 140
Of the 288 visual files attached, 105 contained child pornography, and the
remainder contained child "erotica." 141  When the site was terminated,
132. Id. at 461, 463. The court asserted that "all new members [of the Candyman e-
group] were immediately added to the Candyman Egroup's mailing list . . . . Every
Candyman Egroup member on the Candyman Egroup e-mail list automatically received
every e-mail message and file transmitted to the Candyman Egroup by any Candyman
Egroup member." Id. at 462. This representation, however, turned out to be false, as
members of the Candyman Web site could elect not to receive any e-mails at all. Kunen, 323
F. Supp. 2d at 392.
133. See United States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 2003); Perez,
247 F. Supp. 2d at 479-80. The findings were also mentioned, although not necessarily
adopted by other courts. See, e.g., United States v. Coye, No. 02-CR-732, 2004 WL
1743945, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004); Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 393; United States v.
Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827-30 (D. Neb. 2003).
134. See Coreasi, 419 F.3d 151, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2005).
135. Id. The FBI and two courts found that Binney and others joined the Web site by
simply clicking a button on the Web site. See Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-40; Perez,
247 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
136. Coreasl, 419 F.3d at 153.
137. Id.
138. Coreas 1, 419 F.3d at 152.
139. Id. at 154 (emphasis omitted).
140. Id. at 152.
141. Id. Almost eighty-five percent of the visual postings e-mailed to Agent Binney were
child erotica, which is legal. See Martin I, 426 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2005) (Pooler, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of the Martin cases and Judge Pooler's dissents, see infra Part
II.A.1-2 and Part II.B.2. Child erotica does not rise to the level of child pornography. See
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Yahoo! provided the Government with a list of the 3397 subscribers who
were members between January 29, 2001 and January 31, 2001.142 During
that three-day period, Binney had received four e-mails containing child
pornography from the Candyman site. 143
Another affidavit, based on Binney's flawed affidavit, was submitted to a
magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York in support of a warrant
to search the homes of twenty-four persons. 144 This new affidavit, written
by Agent Berglas, supported a warrant used to search a number of people's
personal computers, documents, videotapes, cameras, and address books. 145
The subsequent searches of people's homes led to a number of
prosecutions nationwide. 146 A controversy within the Second Circuit has
arisen out of two of the cases based on these erroneous affidavits: Martin I
and Coreas L.147 A third case, United States v. Perez,148 has played a major
role in the conflict surrounding these cases as well. Specifically, Perez set
the stage for the conflict within Martin I and Coreas I by holding that the
FBI agents recklessly or knowingly included erroneous information in the
affidavit used to support the Operation Candyman warrants. 149 In Perez,
District Judge Denny Chin ruled that the agents
acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they erroneously
represented, in paragraphs 8(c)-(d) of the affidavit, that all Candyman
members automatically received . . . images of child pornography
transmitted to the group . . . [and] recklessly omitted the fact that
Candyman members had e-mail delivery options, including the option not
to receive any e-mails. 150
Judge Chin disagreed with the other courts that had previously heard
Candyman cases and suppressed the evidence obtained from the
defendant. 151 The next part of this Note examines the conflict that has
emerged in the Second Circuit over the Candyman cases.
Coreas I, 419 F.3d at 152. Child erotica may include children posed in provocative ways.
Id.
142. Coreas 1, 419 F.3d at 152.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 151-52.
145. Id. at 153.
146. See supra note 121.
147. Martin II, 426 F.3d 83; Coreas , 419 F.3d 151.
148. 247 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
149. Id.
150. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 480. The court also found that (1) "[w]hen Binney
executed the affidavit, he knew that motions to suppress had been filed attacking the validity
of the searches," id. at 467; (2) "he knew also that Yahoo was claiming that members of the
groups did have e-mail delivery options," id; (3) "[h]e knew the issue of the availability of e-
mail delivery options was an important one," id. at 469 n.7; and (4) the vast majority of
subscribers had elected to receive no e-mails (2740 out of 3213), id. at 467.
151. Id. at 485 ("The Government relies on rulings in five other Candyman cases denying
other defendants' motions to suppress based upon identical or similar search warrant
affidavits. . . . These cases are not binding on this Court, and are not persuasive ..
(citations omitted)).
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II. THE DIVIDE WITHIN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Part II of this Note discusses the two main approaches taken by courts
that have heard the Candyman cases. United States v. Perez was the first
and only district court case within the Second Circuit to suppress the
evidence obtained from the search warrant, 152 and this argument was later
cited by Judge Rosemary Pooler in her dissents in Martin I and Martin II, as
well as by the Coreas I and Coreas II panels. 153 In the series of Martin
cases, the district court and the majority in the Second Circuit based the
decision to allow the evidence obtained from the search warrant on the idea
that probable cause was satisfied by the defendant's subscription to and
sustained membership in the e-group "girlsl2-16."'154  Judge Pooler,
dissenting in the Martin cases, argued that the subscription to the e-group
was not enough in and of itself to establish probable cause and that
individualized suspicion must be present to amount to probable cause. 155
The Coreas panels in the Second Circuit wanted to reverse the district
court's holding for the same reasoning as Judge Pooler. 156
A. Subscription to the E-Group Established Probable Cause
1. Martin I
At issue in Martin 1157 was the defendant's subscription to an e-group
called "girlsl2-16."'1 58  Joseph Martin appealed from a March 2004
152. See infra Part II.B. 1.
153. See infra Part II.B.2-4.
154. See infra Part II.A.
155. See infra Part II.B.2.
156. See infra Part II.B.3-B.4.
157. 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2005). The opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in United States v. Martin, 418 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2005), was withdrawn
from the bound volume at the request of the court. It was later republished along with an
order denying the appellant's petition for rehearing. See Martin I, 426 F.3d at 83.
158. The welcome message for the girls 12-16 e-group stated:
Hi all, This group is for all those ho [sic] appreciate the young female in here [sic]
finest form. Watching her develop and grow is like poetry in motioon [sic], to an
age where she takes an interest in the joys and pleasures of sex. There is probably
nothing more stimulating than watching a young teen girl discover the pleasures of
the orgasm. The joy of feeling like she is actually coming into womanhood. It's
an age where they have no preconditions about anything, just pure opennes [sic].
What a joy to be a part of that wonderful experience and to watch the development
of this perfect form, This is the place to be if you love 11 to 16 yr olds. You can
share experiences with others, share your views and opinions quite freely without
censorship. You can share all kinds of other information as well regarding-your
current model: if you are a photographer. Where the best place to meet gitls [sic]
is. The difficulties you experience in your quest. The best way to chat up. Good
places to pick girls up. Girls you would like to share with others. The choice is all
yours. Welcome home! Post videos and photographs.., and how about your true
life experiences with them so that other viewers can paint a mental picture andin
[sic] some ways share the experience with you. You could connect with others
from the same country as you and get together sociall [sic] if you wish. The
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amended judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York convicting him, after his guilty plea, of possession of
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and
sentencing him to twenty-seven months of imprisonment.' 59 On appeal,
Martin challenged the district court's May 2003 denial of his motion to
suppress evidence seized from his home.160 The search of Martin's home
arose out of Operation Candyman, and the warrant was based on the
affidavit that contained the erroneous statement that all members of the e-
group received every e-mail and its contents, whether textual, pictorial, or
video.' 61
A divided panel in Martin I found that probable cause still existed when
the false statements were removed from the affidavits used to search the
computer of a defendant who went from the Candyman e-group to a related
group called "girlsl2-16."'162 The majority, comprised of Judges John
Walker and Richard Wesley, ruled that the evidence obtained from Martin's
choice is all yours. How about a model resource for photographers? It's all up to
you and is only limited by your own imaginations. Membership is open to anyone,
but you will need to post something. Mybe [sic] a little bit about yourself/what
your interests are (specifically), your age, location ... and a pic or vid would be
good to [sic]. By doing this other members (or potential members) with the same
interest may then contact you if you wish them to.
Martin 1, 426 F.3d at 71.
159. Id. at 69. Judge Leonard Wexler based his denial of Joseph Martin's motion on his
previous decision in United States v. Coreas, 259 F. Supp. 2d 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), and
stated,
Here, as in Coreas, the facts presented, even without the false statement, support
such a finding [of probable cause]. First, the affidavit contains extensive
background information regarding subscribers to groups such as the Candyman
group and the proclivity of members to use such groups to collect, trade and retain
images of child pornography. The affidavit further describes the Candyman group
in detail. With the exception of the false statement regarding automatic e-mail
receipt, all statements regarding the group and the agent's receipt of numerous
images of child pornography are truthful. It is also without question that the
Defendant joined the group. These facts are sufficient to establish probable cause
to believe that a search of Defendant's computer would reveal evidence of criminal
activity.
Martin I, 426 F.3d at 72.
160. Martin I, 426 F.3d at 69.
161. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text; Martin 1, 426 F.3d at 70. The court
in Martin I noted,
The Martin affidavit covered the search of different premises and contained facts
pertaining to three separate child-pornography e-groups: 'Candyman,' as well as
'girlsl2-16' and 'shangri-la.' The portions relevant to Martin's home, and this
appeal, alleged that an individual residing there was only a member of girls 12-16.
But the affidavit incorporated the following description of the Candyman e-group
and its features into its general discussion of the girlsl2-16 e-group.
Id. The affidavit did not specifically state that members of girls 12-16 automatically received
e-mails, but the court inferred that girlsl2-16 had "many of the same features as the
Candyman" e-group and that the affidavit intended to state that girlsl2-16 members did
receive the automatic e-mails. Id. at 71 n.3. As such, the girlsl2-16 portion of the affidavit
contained the same error as the Candyman portion, and the correction applied to both of the
e-groups. Id.
162. Martin I, 426 F.3d at 68.
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home should be allowed. Judge Pooler dissented from the holding in a
separate opinion where she argued that the majority's opinion runs counter
to the requirement of individualized suspicion required by Ybarra v.
Illinois. 163
For a variety of reasons, probable cause was held to exist even after the
erroneous information was excised from the affidavit. The majority noted
that "the traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable-
cause determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a
'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more." 164 The
majority in Martin I held that
[t]he corrected affidavit provided the magistrate judge with facts
sufficient for her to conclude that the overriding, if not the sole, purpose
of the girlsl2-16 e-group was illicit (to facilitate the receipt and
distribution of child pornography); that an e-mail address of a girlsl2-16
member was linked to Martin's house; that collectors of child
pornography overwhelmingly use the internet and computers to distribute
and hoard this illegal pornographic material; and that, accordingly, there
was a 'fair probability,' given the totality of the circumstances and
common sense, that evidence of a crime would be found at Martin's home
because membership in the e-group reasonably implied use of the
website. 165
The affidavit included a discussion of the modus operandi of those who use
computers for collecting and distributing child pornography, including their
reliance on e-groups, e-mail, bulletin boards, file transfers, and online
storage, 166 as well as a description of the characteristics and proclivities of
child-pornography collectors. 167 The Martin I majority held that the
girlsl2-16 group's illicit purpose of trading child pornography could be
inferred from features available to members, including posting and viewing
files and messages, taking polls, writing and viewing e-mail, and linking. 168
The affidavit also included a confirmation that the girlsl2-16 site included
child pornography and child erotica, which was accessible to all
members. 169 There was evidence in the affidavit that someone at Martin's
residence belonged to the "girlsl2-16 e-group, whose raison d'8tre, or
163. Id. at 89-90 (Pooler, J., dissenting); see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); see
also supra note 109 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Judge Pooler's dissent, see
infra Part II.B.
164. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States 362 U.S.
257, 271 (1960)); see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
165. Martin 1, 426 F.3d at 74-75 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).
166. See id. at 75 (citing United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 838 (D. Neb.
2003)).
167. Collectors of child pornography tend to collect such material, store it, and rarely
destroy or discard it. Id.; Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
168. Martin I, 426 F.3d at 75; see United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882, 890 (5th Cir.
2004).
169. Martin I, 426 F.3d at 75; see United States v. Shields, No. 4:CR-01-0384, 2004 WL
832937, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2004).
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primary reason for existence, was the trading and collection of child
pornography-a wholly illegal endeavor." 170  Furthermore, the majority
held that the girlsl2-16 site's essential purpose was evident from the
group's welcome message.171
The majority faulted Martin's argument that there was no way to obtain
individualized suspicion from the affidavit. First, the majority held that
[w]hile the affidavit does not explicitly state that Martin accessed child
pornography, it ties the girlsl2-16 website to an individual living in
Martin's home, and states child pornography was available to all who
joined and was being distributed to some of the group's members, as
shown by the agent's receipt of e-mails containing illegal child
pornography and his downloading other such material from the
website. 172
Although Martin argued that both legal and illegal purposes existed for the
Web site, he did not offer evidence to support the claim that he or other
members used the e-group for legal purposes.173
Martin I followed rulings of other circuits that also examined the Binney
affidavit. In United States v. Froman, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
without the false statements, the affidavit supported the finding of probable
cause because "[t]he magistrate was entitled to infer from the affidavit that
the singular purpose of Candyman was to trade pornography among its
members."'174 Furthermore, the court held that
it is common sense that a person who voluntarily joins a group such as
Candyman, remains a member of the group for approximately a month
without canceling his subscription, and uses screen names that reflect his
interest in child pornography, would download such pornography from
the website and have it in his possession. 175
170. Martin I, 426 F.3d at 75 (finding it to be "common sense" that one who "voluntarily
joins" a child-pornography group and "remains a member of the group... without canceling
his subscription ... would download such pornography from the website and have it in his
possession" (citing Froman, 355 F.3d at 890-91)); see also Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 824-25
("[K]nowingly becoming a computer subscriber to a specialized internet site that frequently,
obviously, unquestionably and sometimes automatically distributes electronic images of
child pornography to other computer subscribers alone establishes probable cause for a
search of the target subscriber's computer.").
171. Martin I, 426 F.3d at 75. Particularly, the court made note of the invitation for
members to "chat up," "share," and post videos and pictures. See supra note 158 and
accompanying text.
172. Martin I, 426 F.3d at 76.
173. Id. at 77. Legal purposes would include discussing or debating child pornography or
pedophilia. Although the Web sites at issue were not created for users to view pornography,
whether it is legal to simply view child pornography on the Internet is an open question. Id.;
see, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding defendant
knowingly possessed child pornography that was saved in his cache after he viewed it
online); United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 484 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
it remains an open question as to whether 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) reaches Internet
"browsing").
174. Froman, 355 F.3d at 890.
175. Id. at 890-91.
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The Froman case rested on the idea that it is more probable than not that a
person joining a group like Candyman will possess child pornography. 176
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Hutto, also ruled that a member of
the Candyman group was likely to own child pornography and as such
probable cause could be inferred. 177 Hutto, like Froman, was based on the
idea that there is probable cause to believe that child pornography will be
found on the computer of each group member simply based on the nature of
the Internet group. 178
2. Martin II
After Martin was convicted of possession of child pornography, he
petitioned for rehearing and argued that the court
could not find probable cause because (1) the redacted affidavit
'contain[ed] no particularized information regarding whether Martin, or
the e-mail account registered to his home, possessed child pornography,'
as required by Ybarra v. Illinois,179 and (2) it is error to conclude that the
primary purpose of the 'girlsl2-16' e-group was to trade child
pornography because the site also supported the exchange of textual
messages and therefore allowed its members to engage in protected
speech. 180
The panel denied rehearing in Martin II, adhering to the previous holding
that "probable cause existed because there was a fair probability that
contraband or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime would be
found at Martin's residence."' 181
The Martin I majority took notice of the differences between the
Candyman e-group and the girls 12-16 e-group.182 The Martin II holding
cited to Coreas /,183 in which another panel determined that the Martin I
majority did not regard the distinctions between the longer and more
explicit welcome message of girls 12-16 and the shorter welcome message
of Candyman as decisive. 184 The Martin H1 majority clarified that it did not
view the differences as immaterial even though it did state that the "internal
176. United States v. Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
177. United States v. Hutto, 84 F. App'x 6, 8 (10th Cir. 2003). The court stated,
[T]he group's clear purpose was to share child pornography.. . [T]he defendant
voluntarily became a member of the group, and the images containing child
pornography were available to all members. . . . [T]his evidence provided a
sufficient basis . . . to conclude that there was a fair probability that child
pornography would be found at the defendant's residence or on his computer.
Id.
178. Id.
179. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
180. Martin II, 426 F.3d 83, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2005).
181. Id. at 85.
182. Id. at 85-86.
183. 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005).
184. Martin II, 426 F.3d at 85.
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operational characteristics of the two sites were indistinct., 1 85 In fact, in
Martin II, the majority held that "the girlsl2-16 welcome message was an
integral component of [the] probable cause determination." 186
The panel held that the redacted affidavit was sufficient to lead to the
conclusion that the primary purpose of the e-group girlsl2-16 was "to
facilitate the generation, inventory, and exchange of child pornography."'1 87
The fact that the e-group could have been accessed for protected uses did
not sway the panel, as it held that the affidavit supported that individuals
who sought membership were presented with a detailed welcome message
that "unabashedly announced that the group's essential purpose was to trade
child pornography, and that the e-group's members were actively uploading
and downloading child pornography on the site and exchanging e-mail with
illicit attachments."' 188 Although most of the e-mails exchanged were
textual, the panel held that the abundance of textual e-mails "[did] not
diminish the fact that a significant quantity of e-mail contained image-files
of child pornography, and that hundreds of picture- and video-files were
readily available for download on the girlsl2-16 e-group site." 189
Furthermore, the panel held that "[t]ext-based e-mail that helps others
'meet,' 'chat up,' and sexually exploit children is not protected speech." 190
E-mails, which were automatically generated each time a new file was
uploaded to the site, "alerted members to new child pornography available
for download," and the Martin II majority concluded that the automatic e-
mails were "powerful evidence of criminal activity."' 191
The Martin II majority also held that probable cause existed because
Martin joined the e-group after seeing its welcome message and name and
because an e-mail address associated with his household remained in
membership until Yahoo! suspended the group. 192 The majority compared
the e-group to a marijuana collective organization "that may happen to
include members who advocate for the legalization of marijuana, but whose
creed, which is carefully iterated on a plaque adjacent to the entranceway,
provides that the collective is a means to generate, inventory, and barter and
exchange marijuana." 193  In such a situation, the majority held that "a
reasonable magistrate would have no difficulty in finding that there is a fair
probability that each member's store within the collective contains




189. Id. at 86-87. The opinion looks at United States v. Fama, where the Second Circuit
held that "[t]he fact that an innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged,
however, does not negate probable cause." 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1985).
190. Martin II, 426 F.3d at 87.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 87-88.
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marijuana or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime associated with
the production or exchange of marijuana."1 94
The majority noted that following Judge Pooler's standard (detailed in
her dissent) 195 would mean that "a search warrant could only issue where a
magistrate is satisfied that the police will necessarily find contraband or
evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime," which "is plainly not the
standard for probable cause." 196
In a denial for rehearing en banc, the majority reiterated the reasoning of
the previous Martin I and Martin II holdings. 197 Martin then petitioned for
a writ of certiorari that the Supreme Court ultimately denied, thereby
leaving Martin out of appellate options. 198 In an opposition brief to
Martin's petition for writ of certiorari, the Government argued that the fact
that there may have been a legal use for Martin's activities did not negate
probable cause. 199 Further, the Government asserted that a court is not
"precluded from considering conduct susceptible of innocent explanation in
determining whether probable cause exists. 200
Other circuits have subsequently cited the Martin I and Martin H
holdings. The Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit have
all relied on the reasoning in these cases to find probable cause existed to
conduct searches. 201 As such, all of the circuits that have addressed this
issue are currently in agreement that probable cause exists in cases such as
the Candyman cases.
194. Id. at 88.
195. Id. at 89 (Pooler, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.B.2.
196. Martin II, 426 F.3d at 88.
197. Martin III, 430 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2005).
198. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Martin v. United States, No. 05-1073 (U.S. Feb.
16, 2006) [hereinafter Martin Brief]; see also United States v. Martin, 126 S. Ct. 2861
(2006) (denying petition for certiorari).
199. See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11, Martin v. United States, No. 05-
1073 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Martin Opposition Brief].
200. Id. at 12. The Government cited Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), in
arguing that innocent behavior can provide a basis for a showing of probable cause, and cited
the holding in United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277-78 (2002), which held that when
taken together, factors with an innocent explanation can be sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion. Martin Opposition Brief, supra note 199, at 12.
201. See United States v. Shields, No. 05-3662, 2006 WL 2361465, at *6 (3d Cir. Aug.
16, 2006) (holding that probable cause existed where an affidavit tied the defendant to two
child-pornography Web sites that distributed over 100 images of child pornography while
the defendant was a member using an e-mail address that itself was also strongly suggestive
of pornographic activity); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (holding that the government is not required to search a suspect's computer before
applying for and executing a search warrant); United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 540
(6th Cir. 2006) ("[E]vidence that a person has visited or subscribed to websites containing
child pornography supports the conclusion that he has likely downloaded, kept, and
otherwise possessed the material.").
[Vol. 75
THE CA ND YMA N CASES
B. Individualized Suspicion Must Be Present to Amount to Probable Cause
1. United States v. Perez
In Perez, the district court held, in an opinion written by Judge Chin, that
the FBI agents "acted recklessly" by submitting an affidavit "contain[ing]
the false information that all Candyman members automatically received all
e-mails, including e-mails that forwarded images of child pornography, for
the agents had serious doubt as to the truth of the statements or, at a
minimum, they had obvious reasons to doubt their veracity. 202
Additionally, the agents were held to have "acted recklessly in omitting the
information that Candyman members in fact had e-mail delivery options,
including the option of receiving no e-mail at all."'20 3 The conclusion was
based on the fact that Agent Binney was presented with e-mail delivery
options when he joined the Candyman group and when he joined other
groups as well. 20 4 Binney, in fact, did click a "subscribe" button and in
doing so was undoubtedly presented with e-mail options. 205 The district
court held that "the issue of whether members automatically received all e-
mails was 'clearly critical' to a finding of probable cause . . . [and] no
probable cause exist[ed] without it."'20 6 After holding that the agents
recklessly disregarded the fact that not all members of the Candyman group
automatically received every e-mail sent to the Web site, the question left to
resolve was whether probable cause existed when the erroneous information
was excluded from the affidavit.20 7
In Perez, the court held that the "'corrected' affidavit contain[ed] no
representation that the user.., received any e-mails or that he received or
downloaded or viewed any images or files or that he sent or uploaded any
images or files." 20 8  The court noted that the corrected affidavit
"contain[ed] no representation as to how long Perez was a member, whether
he unsubscribed, or whether he did anything beyond subscribing," and
"contain[ed] no information about what it meant to be a 'member' or
'subscriber.' 20 9 In addition, the corrected affidavit did not "allege that the
202. United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also id. at
462 ("These representations were critical because they advised the magistrate judge that all
Candyman members automatically received all e-mails and that therefore all Candyman
members must have received e-mails that contained images of child pornography.").
203. Id. at 479.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 480. The court cited the January 15, 2003 transcript in which the court asked,
"If someone in fact did not get e-mails, then there would be no real basis to prosecute such a
person?" and Binney responded, "That's correct .... Id. (citing Transcript of Record at 62,
Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d (No. 02 Cr. 00854)).
207. Id.




Candyman enterprise was wholly or even largely illegitimate." 210  The
corrected affidavit also did not include a "primary purpose" of the
Candyman e-group, nor was there any assertion that a member would have
downloaded any images by being a member of the e-group for any period of
time.211 The logs provided by Yahoo! showed that Perez did not post or
upload images, and revealed that he, like the majority of subscribers, chose
not to receive any e-mails. 212 "Hence, a magistrate judge could not
conclude, on the face of the 'corrected' affidavit, that a fair probability
existed that all subscribers to the site illegally downloaded or uploaded
images of child pornography." 213 As such, Judge Chin held that, based on
the corrected affidavit, a magistrate could not reasonably conclude that the
Candyman e-group was "'wholly illegitimate' in the criminal sense."'214
The Perez court held that
[i]n the context of this case, a finding of probable cause would not be
reasonable. If the Government is correct in its position that membership
in the Candyman group alone was sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause, then probable cause existed to intrude into the homes of
some 3,400 (or even 6,000) individuals merely because their e-mail
addresses were entered into the Candyman website. Without any
indication that any of these individuals downloaded or uploaded or
transmitted or received any images of child pornography, without any
evidence that these individuals did anything more than simply subscribe,
the Government argues that it had the right to enter their homes to
conduct a search and seize their computers, computer files and equipment,
scanners, and digital cameras. This cannot be what the Fourth
Amendment contemplated. 215
The court ruled that "[w]hile the anonymity of the internet empowers those
who would break the law, it provides law enforcement with crime-fighting
tools, including the ability to go undercover with relative ease and to obtain
significant information from third parties such as service providers." 216
The agents could have requested Yahoo! logs pertaining to which
subscribers received e-mails, which uploaded and/or downloaded images,
and subscription and unsubscription dates.217
Because the court held that the magistrate unreasonably issued a search
warrant based in the affidavit, the evidence derived from the search was
inadmissible. In suppressing the evidence, Judge Chin held that there must
210. Id. For example, members could have either chosen to actively participate in the
group or simply read what others had written.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 483.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 482. Although the affidavit did describe the language of the welcome
message, it did not even include that the e-group was found under the category "Adult,"
"Image Galleries," "Transgender." Id.
215. Id. at 484.
216. Id. at 484-85.
217. Id. at 485.
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be "a certain amount of latitude" in law enforcement "to address those who
would violate the child pornography laws and sexually exploit and abuse
children. Just as there is no higher standard of probable cause when First
Amendment values are implicated... there is no lower standard when the
crimes are repugnant and the suspects frustratingly difficult to detect. '218
Echoing some of Judge Chin's concerns, the district court in United
States v. Kunen219 held that, "[t]he application for the search warrant, if
stripped of the erroneous information, indicates little about [the defendant]
beyond [his] membership" to the Candyman group.220 Aside from the
representation that all members of the Candyman group received all e-
mails, the information provided to the issuing magistrate judge was limited
to a general profile of a "majority" of people "who collect child
pornography." 221 The Kunen court held that a warrant issued "solely upon
group probabilities, rather than upon individualized information . . . is
troubling. '222 The court went further to state that "[e]ven if, arguendo, a
'majority' of Candyman members are more likely than not to have child
pornography on their computers at any given time, that does not, standing
alone, cause the entire membership to be fair game for search warrants. '22 3
218. Id. at 484. The Government did not appeal the Perez verdict after determining that
further prosecution was not in the interest of justice. See Nolle Prosequi at 1, United States v.
Perez, No. 02 Cr. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
219. 323 F. Supp. 2d 390, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
220. Id. The court went on to state,
No information is contained in the application to indicate that [the defendant]
downloaded or transmitted child pornography. It is also apparent from the . . .
affidavit that the Candyman website offered members several features, some of
which-such as participating in 'survey[s]' and 'engag[ing] in real time chat
conversations with each other'-constituted lawful conduct.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting the search warrant affidavit).
221. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id. Judge Dennis Hurley, agreeing with Judge Chin in Perez and Judge Catherine
Perry in United States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2003), held that the
application for the search warrant, without the statement that all members automatically
received e-mails, was insufficient to establish probable cause. Kunen, 323 F. Supp. 2d at
401. Judge Hurley gave a hypothetical to illustrate this point:
[Aissume that statistics established that "a majority" of incarcerated pedophiles
will return to their criminal ways within the first year following their release from
prison; assume further that such individuals invariably take one or more items of
personal property from their victims and stash those items in their, the pedophiles'
residences. From that, it would seem likely that a randomly selected individual
from the group (i.e., pedophiles out of jail for over a year) would have engaged in
the described conduct. If group probability alone is the appropriate focal point for
determining probable cause, then every pedophile fitting the above description
would be subject to the government obtaining a warrant for entry into their homes
to search for evidence of a crime. No effort would be required to demonstrate to
the issuing judge that the targeted suspect falls within the recidivist majority;
simply being a member of the group would suffice. Surely such a result may not
be squared with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; in essence, however, that is the




2. Judge Pooler's Dissent in Martin I and Martin II
Judge Pooler dissented from the ruling of Martin I, calling it "dangerous
precedent" 224 and arguing that it ignored the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of individualized suspicion for finding probable cause. 225 In
her dissent, Judge Pooler stated that the holding effectively made the
decision to visit such Web sites a criminal act, which undermines the First
Amendment. 226  She also claimed that the Fourth Amendment was
compromised since the decision ignored the requirement for individualized
suspicion that a crime has been committed.22 7 Judge Pooler stated that
"[t]he relevant crime in this case, as indicated in the corrected affidavit, is
the knowing transportation, possession, receipt, distribution, or
reproduction of visual (not textual) depictions of children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct. '228
She further cautioned that the majority had improperly held that
membership in the e-group alone reasonably implied participation in the
Web site's illegitimate activities. 229 The affidavit did not indicate that
Martin was ever active within the e-group during the period of time when
he was a subscriber. 230 Pooler noted, "E-group subscription, which requires
a few simple clicks on an individual's personal computer, is simply not
enough to indicate that an individual has taken an affirmative step to
participate in the E-group's activities. The majority can cite no case that
indicates otherwise." 231 Furthermore, Judge Pooler concluded that there
were legal uses for the e-group; simply because some members of the e-
group had engaged in illegal activity does not mean that all members of the
group did so. 232 Finally, Judge Pooler stated, "It is an inferential fallacy of
ancient standing to conclude that, because members of group A (collectors
of illegal visual depictions) are likely to be members of group B
224. Martin I, 426 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2005).
225. Id. at 81-82 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)
("Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by
probable cause particularized with respect to that person.")).
226. See Martin I, 426 F.3d at 78-83 (Pooler, J., dissenting); see also Mark Hamblett,
Circuit Rejects In Banc Review of Porn Warrant, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 22, 2005, at 1.
227. See Martin 1, 426 F.3d at 78-83 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 78 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(1)-(3), 2256(8)); see
also id. at 79 ("Proper consideration of the limited scope of the relevant crime clearly
demonstrates that Agent Binney's erroneous statements-that all subscribers to the girls12-
16 E-group . . . automatically received approximately fourteen illegal visual depictions
during the fourteen days that Martin's e-mail was listed as a subscriber to the E-group---were
crucial to the determination that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would
be found in Martin's home.").
229. Id. at 79 n.9. (citing Martin 1, 426 F.3d at 75).
230. Id. at 79.
231. Id. at 80 (footnote omitted).
232. See id. at 80-81.
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(subscribers to specified E-groups) then group B is entirely, or even largely
composed of, members of group A."'2 33
Judge Pooler dissented again in Martin II, reiterating the concerns from
her original dissent. Judge Pooler discussed the similarities between the
girlsl2-16 Web site and the Candyman Web site, noting that there was no
difference in the primary purpose of the Web sites. 234 Her two main points
were the same as in her prior dissent: that "probable cause cannot be based
on mere group membership" 235 and that "[t]he girls 12-16 welcome message
[did] not establish that the 'primary purpose' of the group was illegal. '236
Because members did not all automatically receive e-mails containing
visual depictions, Judge Pooler stated that the affidavit supporting the
warrant application "contain[ed] no allegation that Martin actually
downloaded, or even viewed, any illegal visual depictions." 237  Mere
membership in the e-group did not provide enough evidence for probable
cause.238  Citing Ybarra v. Illinois,239 Judge Pooler discussed the
requirement of particularized probable cause "with respect to the person
searched. '240 She disagreed with the majority's analogy to a marijuana
collective, examining its imprecise language, the fact that the collective
would be more similar to a conspiracy, and the difficulty "of line drawing
presented by the indecent material at issue here, where some depictions are
illegal child pornography, while others are merely child erotica." 24 1 Judge
Pooler asserted that the Martin rulings and subsequently, the Coreas
rulings, would allow the government to rely on a weak association with an
entity involved in both legal and illegal activity as amounting to probable
cause to search an individual's home.242 Requiring particularized evidence
would not impose too heavy a burden on government enforcement of laws
against child pornography, Judge Pooler asserted, especially in cases such
as Martin in which "the government could easily ... obtain[] information
about a particular subscriber by obtaining the user's email preferences from
Yahoo! or monitoring use of the group."243
Judge Pooler's second basis for her dissent was that "the girlsl2-16
welcome message [did] not establish that the 'primary purpose' of the
233. Id. at 82 ("The majority's conclusion that E-group subscribers are likely to be
collectors of illegal visual depictions is 'common sense' only if one studiously ignores the
affidavit's extensive description of the text-based functions of the E-group." (citing Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))).
234. Martin 11, 426 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2005).
235. Id. at 89 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 90 (emphasis omitted).
237. Id. at 89.
238. Id. at 89.
239. 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
240. Martin I1, 426 F.3d at 89 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 90; see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
242. See Hamblett, supra note 226, at 1, 5.
243. Martin II, 426 F.3d at 89-90 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citing Coreas 1. 419 F.3d 151,
158 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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group [was] illegal. '244 Judge Pooler was particularly concerned with the
fact that "the affidavit supporting the warrant application contain[ed] no
allegation that Martin actually downloaded, or even viewed, any illegal
visual depictions. '245 The welcome message of girlsl2-16 included the
ability to "'share experiences with others, share your views and opinions
quite freely without censorship,' 'connect with others ... and get together
sociall [sic]."' '246 She concluded the majority was incorrect to create
probable cause and make up for a "lack of evidence" by relying on
"membership in an E-group whose 'primary purpose' is allegedly
illegal. '247 She argued that the First Amendment protection against guilt by
association will be diluted, and the Fourth Amendment's protection will be
diminished by relying on the majority's precedent, which "cites no case
supporting the alarming proposition that probable cause may be based
solely on group membership whenever the group's 'primary purpose' is
illegal, rather than on, as has been required in the past, particularized
information about the person or place to be searched. '248
Finally, Judge Pooler noted that Martin's case could not be distinguished
from Willie Coreas's because the internal structures of both Web sites were
the same, both sites invited members to post pictures and videos in addition
to engage in free speech, and there was no evidence in either case that the
defendant actually viewed or collected any child pornography. 249 The fact
that members of girlsl2-16 could post messages, share views, and chat with
others shows that the site was not for purely illegal purposes.250 Although
pictures and videos could be posted, child pornography was present in less
than eight percent of the e-mails, 251 and almost eighty-five percent of the
postings e-mailed to Agent Binney were child erotica, which unlike child
pornography, is not illegal.252 Since less than eight percent of the e-mails
sent to the members of girlsl2-16 contained child pornography, argued
Judge Pooler, "exchanging child pornography can hardly be considered the
primary purpose of the group. 253
In her dissent from the denial for rehearing en banc, Judge Pooler stated,
"I would not dissent after being on the losing side of an [e]n banc poll if I
did not believe that the decision in Martin sets a perilous and plainly wrong
244. Martin II, 426 F.3d at 90 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 89 (citing United States v. Martin, 418 F.3d 148, 160 (2d Cir. 2005)).
246. Id. at 90 (quoting the girls 12-16 e-group).
247. Id. at 89.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 91. The Coreas I court believed that the evidence should have been
suppressed but felt compelled to follow precedent set by Martin L Judge Pooler and the
Coreas I and Coreas H panels effectively had the same reasoning for why probable cause did
not exist in each case. See infra Part II.B.3-4 for a discussion of the Coreas holdings.
250. Martin H1, 426 F.3d at 90 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 91.
252. Id. at 90.
253. Id. at 91.
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precedent. '254 Judge Pooler wrote that she, as well as other colleagues,
believed that both Martin and Coreas had been wrongly decided. 255 She
cautioned residents of the states within the Second Circuit to be wary of
which links they choose to click on the Internet and then urged defense
counsel to petition for certiorari. 256
3. Coreas I
In Coreas I, defendant Coreas's home was searched on the basis of the
same affidavit that was used to search Martin's home and that was found to
be knowingly or recklessly false in a number of material ways.257 About
one hundred computerized images with child pornography were found on
Coreas's home computer and he was indicted on ten counts of possession of
child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B). 258 When Coreas was
indicted on March 13, 2002, serious doubts had already been raised about
Agent Binney's representations.2 59  Specifically, the Government had
obtained information from Yahoo! that of the Candyman e-group members,
more than eighty-five percent had elected to receive no automatic e-mails
whatsoever. 260 In light of the decision in United States v. Perez, Coreas
petitioned for reconsideration of Judge Wexler's denial of the suppression
motion which had led to Coreas's conviction for possession of child
pornography.261 The district court denied this motion on the ground that
254. Martin II, 430 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (Pooler, J., dissenting); see also Hamblett,
supra note 226, at 5 (noting that it is rare that judges write opinions for denials of rehearing
en banc).
255. See Martin III, 430 F.3d at 76 n.3 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 77. Herald Fahringer of Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Salisbury & Cambria,
who assisted in representing Mr. Coreas, stated, "I don't think I have ever seen a case where
a member of the circuit said we should seek certiorari," and also claimed to be "stunned"
that the circuit elected not to rehear the two cases. See Hamblett, supra note 226, at 5.
Fahringer asserted that "[tihe First Amendment implications... taken together with the
unique Fourth and First Amendment challenges posed by Internet technology and the fact
that judges ... have been sharply divided over whether the faulty affidavit should have been
grounds for dismiss[al] .... make the cases ideal for review by the U.S. Supreme Court." Id.
257. Coreas I, 419 F.3d 151, 151 (2d Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 426 F.3d 615 (2d Cir.
2005), reh'g en banc denied, Martin III, 430 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2861 (2006); see, e.g., United States v. Perez, 247 F. Supp. 2d 459, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
United States v. Strauser, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
258. Coreas 1, 419 F.3d at 154.
259. Id. at 154.
260. Id. "Therefore, not only had Binney been wrong to aver that every member
automatically received each e-mail (with pornographic attachments in many cases), but in
fact any given member was unlikely to have received any automatic e-mails from the
group." Id. The Government disclosed the inaccuracy to Coreas's counsel in July of 2002,
and Coreas's counsel moved to suppress the warrant. Id. In response to the motion, the
Government submitted to the court false statements from Binney "reiterat[ing] his
representation that he had joined Candyman via e-mail and had been given no e-mail
delivery options." Id. A number of courts considering the Candyman suppression motions
denied suppression, holding that there was no evidence of the misstatements being
knowingly or recklessly false. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
261. Coreas II, 426 F.3d at615.
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the Berglas affidavit was sufficient to support the warrant even with the
false information excised.262 Judge Jed Rakoff delivered the opinion,
opening with "[c]hild pornography is so repulsive a crime that those
entrusted to root it out may, in their zeal, be tempted to bend or even break
the rules. If they do so, however, they endanger the freedom of all of
us.",
263
In Coreas I, however, the judges begrudgingly ruled that they were
bound by the precedent set by Martin L264 Judge Rakoff, noting the
"knowingly or recklessly false" allegations in the affidavit, stated that the
panel would have found the remaining truthful allegations in the affidavit
were insufficient to support probable cause, but that the panel was bound by
the recent Martin I decision.265 Judge Rakoff also argued that "[t]he
Government's papers submitted in support of the warrant nowhere argued
that the 'collector' allegations could support an inference that any
individual member of Candyman had downloaded child pornography." 266
The panel noted that even if the purpose of the Candyman e-group had been
to distribute pornography, probable cause still would have to be backed by
individualized suspicion as to the target of the search. 267 The Coreas I
262. Id. at 155; see United States v. Coreas, 259 F. Supp. 2d 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
263. Coreas 1, 419 F.3d at 151.
264. Id. at 159 ("[S]ince the Martin case was heard first, we are compelled, under
established rules of this circuit, to affirm Coreas' conviction.").
265. Id. at 153, 158-59 ("[The Government] could have obtained each member's e-mail
preferences and then targeted its warrant applications to those members actually receiving
the e-mails in question. There clearly was no exigency preventing the Government from
taking such steps, given that the warrant application was not made until seven months after
Candyman was shut down. Far from hindering the Government's ability to prevent the
distribution of child pornography over the Internet, requiring particularized information to be
gathered before the warrant application is made will simply focus law enforcement efforts on
those who can reasonably be suspected of receiving child pornography. For these reasons, as
well as for the many other reasons so well articulated by Judge Pooler in her dissent in
Martin, we believe Martin itself was wrongly decided."). The Coreas I panel ruled that
although Martin I may be distinguished on the ground that Coreas joined a different e-group,
the Martin I majority noted that "the affidavit alleged that the way the [two] websites
operated was not materially different." Id. at 157 (internal quotations omitted). "While no
comparable figures for [e-mail options] are given in.. . Martin .... the point is that people
who joined both websites were invited to do so even if their only purpose was to chat about a
taboo subject.. . [and] were provided with the tools to so limit their exchanges." Id.
266. Coreas I, 419 F.3d at 154; see id. at 156 ("The alleged 'proclivities' of collectors of
child pornography, on which the district court relied, are only relevant if there is probable
cause to believe that Coreas is such a collector. But the only evidence of such in the excised
affidavit is his mere act of responding affirmatively to the invitation to join Candyman.").
The Coreas I panel noted that "Martin faults the defendant. . . for failing to submit evidence
that either site was used for legal purposes[,] [b]ut it is the Government's burden to provide
probable cause." Id. at 157-58 (citation omitted).
267. Id. at 158 ("But the Martin majority opinion might be read to suggest that if you
simply web-join an e-group whose 'primary' purpose is the unlawful distribution of
pornography, that is enough to warrant the search of your home---even if there is no
evidence that you knew this was the group's 'primary' purpose or that you actually intended
to use the group for such a purpose rather than for the other, lawful purposes that it also
provided.").
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court faulted the Government for not having obtained each member's e-mail
preferences before making the warrant applications. 268
4. Coreas I
Like Martin, Coreas also petitioned for rehearing subsequent to his
conviction being affirmed.269 A panel comprised of Second Circuit Judges
Dennis Jacobs and Guido Calabresi and District Judge Rakoff presided.270
In the original opinion, the Coreas I panel held that Martin I's precedent
required the court to affirm Coreas's conviction. 271 In his petition for
rehearing, Coreas argued that his case was sufficiently distinct from
Martin's, thereby permitting the panel to rule in any way it chose.272
Subsequent to Coreas's petition for rehearing, but before his actual
rehearing date, the Martin II panel denied rehearing. 273 The Coreas II
panel, after considering Coreas's arguments and the arguments set forth in
Martin II, ruled that the court was bound by the Martin holdings to uphold
Coreas's conviction.2 74
In Coreas II, the panel discussed the suggestion that the difference
between the "girls 12-16" group that Martin joined and the "Candyman"
group that Coreas joined was that the invitation to join the "girls 12-16"
group was more explicit and detailed than the Candyman invitation.275 The
Coreas II panel held, however, that both sites offered the opportunity to
post pictures and videos and engage in conversation. 276 Neither site made it
clear that downloading or exchanging child pornography was the group's
"primary purpose," and there was no evidence in either the Martin or
Coreas cases that either defendant had actually downloaded any child
pornography.277 The panel ruled that it still believed that Martin I was
erroneously decided, but that the panel was bound by that decision to affirm
Coreas's conviction. 278 The Supreme Court denied Coreas's petition for
certiorari, thereby allowing his conviction to stand.2 79
268. Id.
269. See Coreas 1H, 426 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 2005).
270. See id. at 616.
271. See supra text accompanying note 264.
272. Specifically, Coreas argued that the Candyman e-group he subscribed to was unlike
the girlsl2-16 group that Martin joined since the girlsl2-16 group made it clear that its
purpose was to trade child pornography while the Candyman group did not have a clear
purpose. Coreas II, 426 F.3d at 616.
273. 426 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2005).
274. Coreas II, 426 F.3d at 616.
275. Id.
276. Id.; see also Martin I, 426 F.3d at 91 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
277. Coreas 1H, 426 F.3d at 616.
278. Id. at 617.
279. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Coreas v. United States, No. 05-1062 (2d Cir.
Feb. 16, 2006); Reply in Support of Petition for a Writ of Ceriorari, Coreas v. United States,
No. 05-1062 (2d Cir. May 19, 2006); see also United States v. Coreas, 126 S. Ct. 2861
(2006) (denying petition for certiorari).
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III. THE MARTIN HOLDINGS VIOLATE THE FIRST AND FOURTH
AMENDMENTS WITH THEIR FAULTY REASONING
This Note proposes that in the Candyman cases, the evidence should be
suppressed where a defendant was a member of the Candyman site and/or
another Web site containing child pornography, and the warrant to arrest
him was based solely on the erroneous affidavit. Each case must be
examined in light of its own circumstances, for evidence to be allowed into
a trial, it must have been obtained in a constitutional manner. 280 Probable
cause must be present for each defendant in the form of individualized
suspicion.28'
Creation or possession of child pornography is a hideous offense. It is
easy to allow our disgust with the Candyman defendants to cloud our
judgment and allow the evidence to be used against them regardless of the
constitutional ramifications. It is true that some unconstitutionally derived
evidence may protect children from some perpetrators, but constitutional
rights cannot be ignored. Law enforcement officials must take care to
prepare affidavits properly and be sure that the information included is not
recklessly or knowingly false. It is in the initial preparation of the affidavit
that the Candyman cases went wrong. For, it is not enough to look back in
hindsight after finding child pornography and rationalize that the ends make
the warrants constitutional. The judicial system cannot take on the added
responsibility of remedying mistakes made in the initial process of
apprehending a suspect, and the foundation of the judicial system should
not be compromised in order to put criminals behind bars. Allowing
illegally obtained evidence in the Candyman cases would effectively allow
juries to hear any evidence obtained in an illegal manner based solely on the
justification that the defendant did something blameworthy. This would
severely undermine the judicial system, where a postulated reprehensible
act is the first step in all criminal trials.
A. The Majority in the Martin Cases Made Erroneous Factual Conclusions
The majority in both Martin I and Martin II made a number of flawed
analogies and comparisons.
First, the comparison of the e-groups in question to a marijuana
collective is a weak analogy. 282 The hypothetical collective cited by the
Martin II panel ignores the inherent differences between face-to-face
communications and the Internet. Joining the collective organization would
take more work and investigation than clicking a simple "submit" button.
Furthermore, there are many illegal activities that can be associated with
producing and trading marijuana, such as growing the plants, drawing up
smuggling plans, and creating a spray to divert the attention of drug-
280. See supra Part I.D.
281. See id.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
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sniffing dogs. Yet with the e-groups, there were two possibilities: (1) the
members were simply discussing child pornography or (2) the members
were actually viewing and sharing it.283
The Martin majority also discussed perceived differences between the
two e-groups. 284 Even assuming, arguendo, that the girls 12-16 e-group was
more explicit in its welcome message than the Candyman e-group,285 the
problem remains that there should be an individualized probable cause
requirement. 286 A hypothetical subscriber might have hit "subscribe" to
find out more about the group. For instance, there were a number of
typographical errors and a good deal of imprecise language in the girls12-
16 welcome message.287 In order to find out more about the group, a
person would have to subscribe. Assume a hypothetical subscriber does hit
subscribe and realizes that he or she is not interested in the group's
messages or content and simply leaves the site without going through the
unsubscribe process. Suppose further that this person deletes any and all
correspondence from the group without reading it. By the Martin court's
line of reasoning, the hypothetical subscriber would be likely to possess
child pornography and would be subject to a search and seizure. Should the
lesson be that the average Internet user must be savvy and intelligent
enough to anticipate this and make sure to retrace all of his or her steps to
eradicate any and all evidence of having even looked at questionable Web
sites? 2 88
The Martin II majority held that most textual messages sent to members
of the e-group informed members of new files posted and their locations
and called this "powerful evidence of criminal activity. '' 289 This reasoning
would follow if the FBI agents had actually looked into individual
members' activity and found that Martin actually received the e-mails. For
example, if user X did receive a text-based e-mail with the location of a
new file and then retrieved that file, that activity could support a finding of
probable cause.
Additionally, in Martin II, the majority had no trouble separating the case
at issue from Ybarra v. Illinois,290 because in Ybarra, police, acting on
information that a bartender possessed heroin, entered a bar, and also
frisked its patrons.291 The Supreme Court held that the police lacked
probable cause to search Ybarra, who was a patron in the bar and was found
283. See supra Part II.B.2.
284. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part I.D.
287. See supra note 158.
288. "Average user" in this context refers to a person who might look at and/or join a
questionable group without having any knowledge that even joining for legal purposes such
as exchanging text-based commentary could lead to a criminal prosecution.
289. See supra text accompanying note 191.
290. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
291. See id. at 88.
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to have heroin on his person. 292 The Martin H majority held that the cases
are "quite different" because the warrant was associated with Martin's
home and "anyone joining the girls 12-16 site was on notice that the site was
an active marketplace for the illicit trade of child pornography. 29 3  In
Ybarra, however, the Supreme Court held that "a person's mere propinquity
to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without
more, give rise to probable cause to search that person." 294 The Court made
no mention of how it would have ruled if the bar searched was anything
similar to an "active marketplace" for the illicit use of heroin.
The e-group itself can be analogized to the bar in Ybarra, with all
members like the patrons. Then, under Ybarra, the court's refusal to
suppress the evidence obtained from the search of Martin's home was in
error.
It is fairly simple to join an e-group like those joined by the defendants in
Martin, Coreas, and Perez. Take for example, a person looking to join a
Yahoo! e-group. As of October 2005, if that person went to
www.yahoo.com and clicked on "groups," then "romance & relationships,"
then "singles," and finally "bisexual," that person would find that there
were over 800 groups. One of the first groups would be a group called
"sohalst2002" with over 9000 members. The problem is that in the
welcome message for that group, the blurb contains only characters and
symbols. 295 But this person sees the membership and decides to subscribe
to learn more about the group. 296 The person clicks one button at the top of
the page, "Join This Group," fills out a simple form with his e-mail address
and message delivery options, and then subsequently stumbles upon a new
page with a welcome message that indicates the presence of child
pornography. Appalled, he closes his web browser and shuts off his
computer without even thinking about unsubscribing. According to the
Martin rulings, this person's simple online curiosity might subject him to a
search of his home and seizure of his personal files.297
Finally, the Martin I and Martin II majority also made a questionable
jump in logic to improperly classify subscribers to the e-groups as people
292. Id. at 89-90.
293. Martin II, 426 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2005).
294. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91; see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
295. This was not the case with the Candyman Web sites. Each had welcome messages
that were included in the affidavit. The Candyman messages as well as a message composed
of random characters and symbols may be enough to put a would-be member on alert that
something questionable might be found on the site, but neither type of message could be said
to definitively give would-be members knowledge that the site is mainly used for illegal
purposes.
296. Many e-groups require people to "Join This Group" before being able to learn any
more about the postings and membership.
297. In Martin II, the majority relied both on the girlsl2-16 welcome message and the
fact that Martin remained a member of the e-group until it was shut down. See supra notes
187-92 and accompanying text. The majority did not explain whether one factor was
dispositive and did not address how the holding would affect cases like the hypothetical
described here.
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who would be likely to own and/or trade child pornography. Based upon
the corrected affidavit, these offenders exhibited only two of sixteen
behaviors usually used to classify a preferential sex offender. 298 The
majority's argument that probable cause existed was based on the idea that
the defendants subscribed to a Web site with child pornography, and such
people are more likely than not to own child pornography. The courts did
not cite any statistics as a basis for the reasoning. The problem with
assuming that because a person exhibits behaviors characteristic of a sex
offender (for example, by joining an e-group that involves the trade,
exchange, and posting of images and videos of child pornography), he or
she is more likely to own or trade pornographic images, is that the
assumption requires too great of a leap. A person who joins a Web site
geared toward exchanging pornographic images of children can be said to
have a specific sexual interest in children. Joining the Web site can be
considered a well-developed technique used to fulfill that interest.299 If that
person has been on such a Web site for long periods of time or expends a
good deal of time, energy, and money on the Web site, those efforts tend to
demonstrate long-term and persistent patterns of illicit behavior.300 An
investigator may then understandably assert that such a person exhibits
characteristics of a preferential sex offender. But, in instances like the
Candyman cases where the only information known about the offenders
was that they subscribed to textually based Web sites containing child
pornography (falling under both specific sexual interest and well-developed
technique), it is improper to immediately classify them as preferential sex
offenders who necessarily collect and/or trade child pornography. Simply
subscribing to a Web site where people like to discuss child pornography,
albeit disgusting, is not enough in and of itself to find probable cause to link
members to illegal activity.30 1
The Martin I majority was, in effect, straining to classify the defendants
as preferential-type sex offenders or pedophiles in order to justify finding
probable cause that they traded or owned child pornography. The
defendants had no prior convictions. They were eventually found to own
and/or trade child pornography (thus they were deemed pedophiles), but
this information was obtained after an improper search and should not be
used to support probable cause for the search warrant.
298. See supra Part I.B.2.
299. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
301. Cf United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[M]ere
membership . . . without a link to actual criminal activity, [is] insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause."); United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 794 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that membership in Hell's Angels does not establish probable cause that defendant
engaged in illegal activity); United States v. Acosta, 110 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (E.D. Wis.
2000) ("Information about a group's reputation is legally insufficient to support probable
cause that a member of that group is involved in criminal activities .... Thus, a mere
inference of gang membership, without more, provides no basis for concluding that a search
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.").
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B. The Martin Holdings Violate the First Amendment
The Martin II panel held that "[t]ext-based e-mail that helps others
'meet,' 'chat up,' and sexually exploit children is not protected speech. '302
Again, this is dangerous precedent. There was no particularized
information in the affidavit stating that the e-mails exchanged over girls 12-
16 or the Candyman e-group facilitated "meeting" or "chatting up" or the
sexual exploitation of children. Rather, this is an assumed link that the
panel made, with good intention, to protect children from possible harm,
albeit at the expense of the constitutional rights of many citizens. Even if
the e-mails "alerted members to new child pornography available for
download, ' 303 this does not mean that the members were accessing the new
pornography. Those e-mails should not be rendered "powerful evidence of
criminal activity" to amount to probable cause without a stronger showing
that the defendants in question actually accessed or were particularly likely
to have accessed the child pornography.
Finding probable cause in the Candyman cases violates First Amendment
rights. 30 4 There are people who subscribe to Internet groups simply to
discuss topics-a right that is protected by the Constitution. Any of the
Candyman defendants might have subscribed to and remained a member of
the chat group in order to talk about child pornography. This activity, while
not socially acceptable, is constitutionally protected. Similarly, someone
who subscribes to High Times magazine 30 5 is not necessarily a marijuana
smoker. While it might be a fair assumption that a subscriber to such a
magazine might be more likely to smoke marijuana than a non-subscriber,
the government certainly cannot find every person who buys the magazine
and then search those people's homes without violating the Constitution. 30 6
Take, for example, the CPPA. 30 7 The Supreme Court could have upheld
the CPPA by saying that the safeguarding of children and the prevention of
their exploitation took precedent over the First Amendment concerns raised.
Instead, the Court struck the Act down as overbroad. 30 8 Similarly, a
Yahoo! group, or any other Internet group for that matter, may involve a
person joining the e-group seeking to combat child pornography. Under the
logic of the Martin holdings, a user who simply subscribes to a site with a
welcome message like the "Candyman" welcome message to confront users
of the group and who sends messages to them expressing disgust would be
302. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
303. See supra text accompanying note 191.
304. See supra Part I.C.
305. High Times is a magazine and Web site that contains information and stories having
to do with marijuana. High Times includes advertisements for "legal smoking buds" and
stories about people who have been "busted" for growing or using marijuana. See High
Times, http://www.hightimes.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
306. See supra Part I.D.
307. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
308. "[T]he mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason
for banning it." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002); see supra notes
72-73 and accompanying text.
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subject to having his or her home searched and computer files seized.
While subscribing to a pornographic site might not be the best or most
effective way to get involved in the war against child pornography, it is
improper to subject these individuals to an invasive search and/or seizure.
Without viewing or trading images of child pornography, such an individual
has not engaged in activity that amounts to probable cause.30 9
C. The Martin Holdings Violate the Fourth Amendment
The main issue with the Candyman cases is that when the erroneous
information in the affidavit is removed, little substance is left to support
probable cause. In the Candyman cases, not only is the First Amendment
implicated by the Martin rulings (and subsequently, the Coreas holdings),
but the Fourth Amendment is implicated, as well. 3 10 This makes the
precedent set by the Second Circuit doubly dangerous.
The Fourth Amendment mandates that a warrant shall only be issued
when there is probable cause that is supported by affirmation. 311 In the
Candyman cases, the affidavits were clearly erroneous. 312 The Martin I
Court held that probable cause existed based on the idea that "those who
view are likely to download and store child pornography. ' '313 Although this
idea was included in the holding as to why the evidence should be admitted,
the court did not cite any statistics to support this statement.
Another issue with finding probable cause is that the welcome message
said nothing explicit about child pornography. 314 A user could not see the
contents of the Web site until he or she had subscribed to the group. Agent
Binney admitted that a person could feasibly subscribe to the Web site and
never go back.315 Additionally, a person could subscribe and subsequently
forget about the subscription if he or she had not elected to receive
e-mails. 316
At least one other court besides the Perez court has recognized that more
than subscription is needed for probable cause. In State v. Staley, a Georgia
state court held that the state lacked probable cause to search a convicted
child molester's apartment and computer where there was no link between
the apartment and the computer files found and the alleged molestation of a
woman the defendant met through a personal ad seeking "younger wom[e]n
with children." 317 There was no evidence that the molestation took place at
the apartment or that a child had been there, there was no evidence that the
309. See supra Part I.C-D.
310. See id.
311. See supra Part I.D.
312. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
313. See Martin I, 426 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2005).
314. See Perez Transcript, supra note 43, at 76.
315. Id. at 78-79.
316. Id. at 79.
317. State v. Staley, 548 S.E.2d 26, 28-29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
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defendant showed sexually explicit material to children, and there was no
evidence that the defendant communicated with children via e-mail.318
The Martin court was satisfied with the statistics and profile of people
who frequent pornographic Web sites,319 but these are not convincing. To
satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirements, an affidavit must contain
enough specific information pertaining to the persons in question to warrant
a search of private property. 320
As the majority of members of the Candyman group opted not to receive
any attachments, the Second Circuit effectively held that clicking a "join"
button to discuss child pornography establishes probable cause that a person
is in possession of child pornography or is a pedophile.321 Speech, whether
in person or in a computer-mediated setting, is protected by the First
Amendment, even when it is sometimes offensive to most of society.
Because probable cause requires that there be a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, 322 it is
necessary to examine the link between the correct factual information in the
affidavit and a defendant's individualized circumstances. 323 The affidavit,
with the erroneous information removed, simply contains information about
the welcome page of the Candyman Web site and the tendencies of people
who join such Web sites. The question is whether it is proper to assume
that simply joining an Internet group where some members, but far from a
majority of them, are using the group for illegal purposes can lead to a fair
probability that every member has committed a crime.324 Answering this
question in the affirmative involves a large jump in logic. Had Agent
Binney's initial affidavit contained proper information-that is, had it
actually been the case that in order to subscribe to the Candyman Web site,
would-be members were informed that they would be receiving all e-mails
with pictorial and video attachments-then this assumption could be said to
be fair.
In Martin II, the court cited United States v. Fama, which held that "[t]he
fact that an innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged
... does not negate probable cause. '325  By this line of reasoning,
individuals can easily be found guilty by association. This completely
undermines the probable cause requirement enshrined in the Fourth
Amendment.
318. Id. at 29.
319. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Part I.D.
321. See supra Part II.A.
322. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (citations omitted); see supra note 106
and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
324. See supra text accompanying note 260.
325. 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1985); see supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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In the Government's brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari in
the case of Martin v. United States,326 the Government made mention of
United States v. Arvizu. 327 Arvizu asserted that "although each factor in a
reasonable-suspicion analysis may have ... an innocent explanation, taken
together, they [can be] sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. ' 328 The
Government applied Arvizu improperly, however. The brief goes on to say
that by
[a]pplying the commonsense approach that informs the probable cause
determination ... a reviewing court could reasonably conclude that an
individual who 'chats' with like-minded people about sex with children,
votes on what age groups they prefer, and visits other child pornography
sites also downloads the readily accessible child pornography that is the e-
group's mainstay. 329
This reasoning is flawed for a number of reasons. First, Martin was in fact
a member of the girlsl2-16 e-group, but there is no evidence that shows
whether or how often he "chatted" on the site or whether he voted on which
age group he preferred. Second, Arvizu specifically states that innocent
factors, "taken together," can establish reasonable suspicion.330 Here, there
was only one definite factor-that Martin joined an e-group with a welcome
message that alluded to illegal activity.
The Government's brief 331 also applied United States v. Gourde,332 but
this application was improper. In Gourde, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that because an affidavit did not contain "concrete
evidence" that he had downloaded child pornography, probable cause did
not exist. 333 Micah Gourde, unlike Martin and Coreas, paid about twenty
dollars a month to join a Web site called lolitagurls.com, which contained
graphic images on its homepage. 334 Martin and Coreas, in contrast, joined
a free Yahoo! chat group by clicking a "join" button after reading a textual
welcome message. 335 Because the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 is a
possessory offense, probable cause is not supported by a person exhibiting
an interest in proscribed materials; there must be an individualized
indication of ownership. Reliance on United States v. Froman336 is also not
326. 126 S. Ct. 2861 (2006).
327. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
328. See Martin Opposition Brief, supra note 199, at 12.
329. Id.
330. See supra text accompanying note 328.
331. See Martin Opposition Brief, supra note 199, at 14, 15.
332. 440 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
333. See Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1072. In Gourde, the Ninth Circuit was divided in an en
banc decision, with two judges dissenting. Id. at 1074-84.
334. See id at 1070 ("To become a member requires what are at first glance little, easy
steps. It was easy for Gourde to submit his home address, email address and credit card data,
and he consented to have $19.95 deducted from his credit card every month. But these steps,
however easy, only could have been intentional and were not insignificant. Gourde could
not have become a member by accident or by a mere click of a button.").
335. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
336. 355 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 2004).
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on point for the Candyman defendants, 337 as Martin did not have a screen
name that alluded to any interest in child pornography. 338 In short,
although all of the cases discussed in this Note stem from either the
Candyman e-group or a similar group, there is still the need for
individualized review when evaluating whether probable cause exists. 339
It is certainly true that the Internet poses problems to the regulation of
illegal activity. It is also true that sexual abuse of children is a major
societal concern. But these two truths do not, and should not, add up to a
third assumed truth that all people who decide to participate in a discussion
about a criminal activity are legally deemed likely to be engaging in that
activity. Perhaps many of these people are engaging in illegal activity, but
without individualized evidence, the assumption damages the integrity of
the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution.
The question remains, where should the line be drawn? If a person has
subscribed to one Web site like the Candyman site, and that one
subscription is not enough to find probable cause, then what number of
subscriptions to such sites would be enough to amount to probable cause?
Two? Ten? Fifty-seven? It seems reasonable to assume that a person who
subscribes to fifty-seven sites is likely to possess child pornography. But
where should the line be drawn? What if a person subscribed to Web sites
to log on and tell everybody else on the Web sites that they are all
disgusting and should be incarcerated? While such a course of action may
not be wise, the government is perhaps placing too high of an expectation
on average citizens to really inspect their private behaviors and choices for
potential misunderstandings and repercussions before they act.
Some fairly simple initial steps can be taken to combat this problem. All
affidavits should be required to be sufficiently individualized and detailed
to show probable cause in each case. The biggest issue with the Martin and
Coreas holdings is that the affidavits did not contain any particularized
information about whether the defendants had received or transmitted any
files. Had the defendants been found to have transmitted any video or
picture files, then probable cause would clearly have existed. Furthermore,
337. See id. at 890-91 (stating that "it is common sense that a person who voluntarily
joins a group such as Candyman, remains a member of the group for approximately a month
without canceling his subscription, and uses screen names that reflect his interest in child
pornography, would download such pornography from the website and have it in his
possession").
338. Martin's e-mail address was Joeym@optonline.net. See Martin Il, 430 F.3d 73, 75
(2d Cir. 2005). Coreas's e-mail address was revbd@yahoo.com. See Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant at 8, Coreas v. United States, No. 05-1062 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 2006).
339. See Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1084 (Kleinfield, J., dissenting) ("The majority concludes
that the affidavit made out probable cause by assuming that anyone who subscribes to an
internet site with both legal and illegal material must collect illegal material from the site.
This assumption stacks inference upon inference until the conclusion is too weak to support
the invasion of privacy entailed by a search warrant .... [T]he overwhelming importance of
the privacy of people's computers makes it essential to assure that-even in this ugly corner
of human perversion-probable cause seriously interpreted remain[s] a prerequisite for
search warrants.").
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Web sites such as Yahoo! Groups should be required to post warnings to all
potential subscribers about the criminal repercussions of sharing and
posting illegal images of child pornography. Finally, Internet service
providers, like Yahoo!, should be required to have better moderator systems
that more readily detect and shut down sites where users post illegal
pictures and videos. 340
The stark split within the Second Circuit remains since the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari in the Martin and Coreas cases. 341 The Coreas
panels reluctantly affirmed Coreas's conviction and reluctantly denied
rehearing but felt compelled to do so only because of the Martin
holdings.342 While the Coreas panel found the differences in the e-groups
girlsl2-16 and Candyman to be immaterial, the Martin majority used the
differences as an "integral component" of the finding that probable cause
existed to search Martin's home. 343 Perhaps a circuit that has not yet dealt
with a case like the Candyman cases will rule the way the Coreas court
would have liked to and the issue will become ripe for Supreme Court
review.
CONCLUSION
Protecting children from exploitation is of paramount importance, but it
cannot take precedence over constitutional rights. It is a terrible reality that
in the Candyman cases, each defendant did, in fact, own or trade child
pornography. In retrospect, only after the defendants' Fourth Amendment
rights were violated, was this realized, however. Although the circuit
courts are currently in agreement about the correct outcome for the
Candyman cases, not all district courts agree. The Candyman cases are a
clear example of how societal views can infiltrate the decision-making
process and manipulate legal analysis. A person's constitutional rights
should not be thwarted because he or she does something that society views
as repulsive. If the Candyman verdicts are allowed to stand, a number of
innocent people's rights could be jeopardized in the future.
340. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text for measures that have been taken to
date.
341. See Martin v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2861 (2006); Coreas v. United States, 126 S.
Ct. 2861 (2006).
342. See supra Part II.B.3-4.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
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